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An exhibition of john August Swanson's work 
has been shown during the month of April in the 
VU Student Union. The exhibit is sponsored 
jointly by The Cresset, the Liturgical Institute, 
and Bergsma Galleries, Grand Rapids, 
Michigan. Mr. Swanson is a speaker at the 
1992 Institute of Liturgical Studies and Church 
Music Seminar, held 28-30 April. 
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The Nets Are Breaking! The Nets Are Breaking! 
This month's cover reproduces a painting by John 
August Swanson, and brings up into our attention the story 
of the miraculous draught of fishes, as it used to be called 
in the old days. The painting barely contains the fish, who 
seem to desire to leap out of the constraints of the flat 
surface. They curve and splash and dart before our eyes, 
the quicksilver of their motion translated into a dozen 
different colors. Looking at the fish, and at the four 
puzzled fishermen, I am drawn back into a question that 
has been uppermost on many campus minds during these 
weeks: How can we be diverse and be ourselves? 
The story in the gospel, at least as John tells it, brings 
up a number of issues. But it is certainly about what to do 
with "too many." Here, after a night of nothing, they catch 
so many fish that the nets almost break, or "tantos peces 
que las redes casi se rompfan," as Swanson's border says. 
The fishermen in the painting reflect several possible 
responses to this phenomenon; I can hear the sermon 
series now. On the far right the First man is earnest-to 
me he looks tired. He seems to be looking at the fish, but 
seeing little. Only his fingertips touch the net's edge. In 
fact, he seems little affected, even by the wind, unlike 
Fisherman Two, whose hair blows out wildly. This man's 
eyes are wide; the whites show us that he is astonished. He 
looks down-whether at fish or nets-engaged and intent, 
and his hands are in the nets up to his wrists. The Third 
Fisherman looks out at us, direct and straight-ahead. 
Could he be the figure who represents John? He is in 
contact with the observers, as much conscious of the 
outside of the scene as we are. And the Fourth, the 
helmsman? He really looks exhausted, all in, ready for the 
end of this experience, however miraculous. 
Well, what is the story for? It surely has something to 
do with our fears about nets breaking. John's account, in 
an odd Iitle detail, tells us that the net was full of one 
hundred and fifty-three fish. Why? Fred Niedner tells me 
that this was the number of known species of fish in the 
Galilean world, and so that the number represents 
inclusiveness. The net takes in all that we know-and it 
does not break. 
Wrestling with plurality has almost replaced baseball 
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as the great American game. We sought plurality (in some 
sense), we prided ourselves on it (at moments), we 
celebrated it (at least on monuments) and we thought we 
meant it. In the church, we have said that we want to 
include every kind of believer, every kind of person with 
the desire for faith. Diversity is good; more diversity is 
better. We have deferred until another time the question 
of how much diversity is possible, of how many every bodies 
we mean. But moments of 
crisis, or even moments of decision-making, force us to do 
more than nod in solemn agreement that the questions are 
important. We may even have to vote. Can we include so 
much of the Other that there ceases to be an other because 
there is no integrity to the element against which it is 
defined? Many of our institutions face exactly this 
decision, in terms of real hiring of real people. And the 
questions, posed in terms of real people, are filled with real 
pain. 
It is good then, to be reminded about nets. There is, 
in this story at least, an assurance that nets cast widely out 
on the basis of Jesus' command will hold. Such a reading 
insists that we be serious about the basis on which we desire 
inclusiveness or plurality or diversity. If we desire these 
things so that we photograph well, or so that we will catch a 
trend, or so that we will foster our own sense of superiority, 
then at some point we will rightly fear "Too many!" But if 
we are, as Christians, going about our true work, patiently 
feeding and gathering, then the nets will hold. And if 
we're lucky, there will even be breakfast on the beach. 
a 
We've had a good deal of correspondence this month 
reacting to Ed Byrne's column in the March issue 
concerning feminism and film. Ed has answered at least 
some of this mail, but what was addressed to me deserves 
some answer here. I did not agree with the sentiments in 
Byrne's column. I do not believe that feminism fails to 
represent what most women in this culture want for 
themselves and their society. But The Cresset is, after all, a 
journal of opinion. As its editor, I choose some things, 
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encourage writers to take up topics they have told me are 
on their minds, nudge them in directions I think are 
helpful or persuasive-and then I work on things like the 
placement of articles, the setting up and punctuation of 
poems, checking spelling, and arguing with the post office 
over labels. In this space I write my opinions, and, having 
chosen a columnist, I let him make his own mistakes or 
triumphs in his own space. I reject utterly the idea that The 
Cresset is discredited because I chose to print an article 
whose position I personally disavow. Though Professor 
Byrne's piece would not perhaps satisfy every possible 
criterion for opinion writing, and I think it could be 
debated whether or not he fairly represented the opposing 
positions, his subject is one about which there can be 
considerable disagreement, even among people of good 
will. And no one could remain an editor without believing 
that the phrase "people of good will" described her 
readers--most of the time. 
This issue brings to a close another year of Cressets. 
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Thinking about art, and a number of art forms, has given 
rise to most of the writing here, and we trust that many of 
you will find these comments compelling. The prospect of 
summer advances, and though people in the professoriate 
no longer enjoy the halcyon days of ease immortalized in 
The Professor's House, Willa Cather's beautiful novel with an 
academic hero, we do look forward to longer periods of 
reading, and a reasonable amount of staring out over the 
waters of Lake Michigan. We will plan a new course, and 
think about what should be in The Cresset next year. 
Readers with ideas on this subject should write to the 
editor, who promises not to lose letters while climbing sand 
dunes. 
0 
Near One Historical Site 
The forest should fill with proper nouns, 
History walk forward with its hands up, 
But I am so ignorant of names 
I think it arms them. These leaves, those stems, 
The generals and lieutenants are words 
Which slur in a Doppler drift of wind. 
For a moment, my son skids, stops, wavers 
In the shale, astonished as the newly 
Wounded. He demands the right way up 
This cliffside, the locations where stone 
Sits firm. His drummer-boy face might be 
Following a flag towards cannons while 
The pines retreat, the bushes squat, and we 
Balance above a battlefield, foolish 
Snipers believing the war so distant 
Everything red oozes into the earth 
And the trees until the forest turns 






On the Day of Pentecost 
for Calvin Henry Francis, Sr. 
Down Westchester Avenue he tramps 
Following the tracks of the el 
Through the broken borough, 
Trains thundering overhead 
Like the sound of a mighty wind. 
A new kind of Francis, this Francis, 
Far from the fields of Assisi, 
Far from the flow of nature's beauty 
Where birds and moon are family. 
He walks with a flame of fire on his head, 
The red wool cap pulled over his right ear, 
Greeting confused people on the street 
In slurred speech, each in native tongue: 
Shalom aleichem! Buenos dias! Griiss Gott! 
As if he were chief host at Ellis Island 
Welcoming novices into the new world. 
Hardly anyone notices anymore 
As he shuffles from block to block, 
Singing "Glory, Glory, Alleluia!" 
Stopping to pick up a coded message 
On a discarded candy wrapper or match folder 
Announcing cryptically an apocalyptic end; 
Picking a rose-"Yellow for the Holy Spirit;" 
Smoothing out a piece of tinfoil-
"God shine on you and your family." 
Losing teeth, losing strength, losing time, 
He plods down streets seeking a son or daughter, 
Mother or father, human arms 
To grasp, to clasp him in comfort and warmth 
Removing the chill of lonely hallway nights, 
Providing a household believing he is who he is, 
Not drunk or drugged, but dreaming 
Dreams belonging to old men. 
Only phantom folds, not earthly embrace, 
Cradle him, guard him, throw him 
At the altar prostrate 
Where, like home, without shoes, without shame, 
Known beneath all knowing, 
Drawn yet dreading to such holiness 
He hears the gifting-gifted voices 
Of angels singing in clear harmony: 




There were three in the meadow by the brook 
Gathering up windrows, piling coclrs of hay, 
With an eye always lifted toward the west 
Where an irregular sun-lxmlered cloud 
Darlrly advanced with a perpetual dagger 
Fliclrering across its bosom. Suddenly 
One helper, thrusting pitchfork in the ground, 
Marched himself off the field and home. One stayed. 
The town-bred farmer Jailed to understand. 
'What is there wrong 7' 
'Something you just no~ said' 
'What did I say7' 
~bout our taking pains. ' 
To cock the hay 7- because it's going to shower7 
I said that mlm! than half an hour ago. 
I said it to myself as much as you. ' 
'You didn't know. But james is one bigfool. 
He thought you meant to find fault with his work. 
That's what the average farmer would have meant. 
James would take time, of course, to chew it over 
Before he acted: he's just got round to act., 
'He is a fool if that's the way he takes me. ' 
'Don't let it bother you. You'vefound out something. 
The hand that knows his business won't be told 
To do work better or faster-those two things. 
I'm as particular as anyone: 
Most likely I'd have served you just the same. 
But I know you don't understand our ways. 
You were just talking what was in your mind. 
What was in all our minds, and you weren't hinting. 
Tell you a story of what happened once: 
I was up here in Salem at a man's 
Named Sanders with a gang of Jour or [roe 
Doing the haying. No one liked the boss. 
He was one of the kind sports call a spider, 
All wiry arms and legs that spread out wavy 
From a humped body nigh as big's a biscuit 
But work! that man could work, especially 
If by so doing he could get more work 
Out of his hired help.· I'm not denying 
He was hard on himself I couldn't find 
That he lu!pt any hours-not for himself 
Daylight and lantern-light were one to him: 
I've heard him pounding in the barn all night. 
But what he liked was someone to encourage. 
Them that he couldn't lead he'd get behind 
And drive, the way you can, you know, in mowing-
Keep at their heels and threaten to mow their legs off. 
I'd seen about enough of his hulling triclrs 
(We call that hulling). I'd been watching him. 
So when he paired off with me in the hayfzeld 
ROBERT FROST'S "THE CODE": A CONTEXT AND A COMMENTARY 
I 
In October of 1900, Robert Frost, his wife Elinor, and 
their daughter Leslie took up residence at Derry Farm near 
Derry Village in New Hampshire. The farm had been 
purchased for Frost (though he was not to own it outright 
until 1911, when he promptly sold it) by his paternal 
grandfather, William Prescott Frost, who had also 
arranged, without consulting Robert in the matter, for a 
hired man in the person of one Carl Burell, a long-time 
friend of Frost's, an amateur poet, an enthusiastic botanist, 
John Feaster is a professor of English at VU. In a long career, he 
has taught hundreds of works, but has newly re-discovered an 
engagement with the works of early twentieth century American 
writers. His essay on Stephen Crane will appear this summer in 
American Literary Realism. The pressent essay is part of a 
longer study of Frost's treatment of the subject of work. 
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John Feaster 
and, most important from an altogether practical 
standpoint, someone considerably more experienced than 
was Frost in the practical matter of eking a living out of a 
rocky farm in southern New Hampshire. 
The perfectly sensible nature of these arrangements 
notwithstanding, Frost, according to his biographer, 
Lawrance Thompson, was "furious" that his grandfather 
and Burell had devised them without consulting him. His 
resentment was made all the greater, Thompson goes on to 
report, because even though Carl Burell was "a good 
friend, a hard worker, a conscientious human being, ... 
ever since high school days he had treated Rob solicitously, 
as though Rob didn't even know how to sharpen a pencil. 
Now he joined in a 'conspiracy' with Rob's grandfather 
without even asking the person most concerned. 'I take a 
long time to wreak vengeance, when I've been wronged,' 
Frost later said of this arrangement, 'but I never forget, and 
I never forgive a wrong'" (26~). 
The Cresset 
To load the load, thinlts I, Look out for trouble. 
I built the load and tapped it off; old Sanders 
Combed it doum with a rake and says, ·o. K" 
Everything went well till we reached the bam 
With a big jag to empty in a bay. 
You understand that meant the easy job 
For the man up on top of throwing down 
The hay and rolling it off wholesale, 
Where on a mow it would have been slow lifting. 
You wouldn't thinJr. afellow'd nud much urging 
Under those circumstances, would you now7 
But the old fool seizes his fork in both hands, 
And looking up bewhiskered out of the pit, 
Shouts like an army captain, •Let her come!" 
Thinks I, D'ye mean it7 ·~at was that you said?" 
I asked out loud, so's there'd be no mistake, 
•Did you say, Let her come7" •Yes, let her come." 
He said it O'VeT, but he said it softer. 
Never you say a thing like that to a man, 
Not if he values what he is. God, I'd as soon 
Murdered him as left out his middle name. 
I'd built the load and knew right where to find it. 
Two or three furltfuls I picked lightly round for 
Like meditating, and then I just dug in 
And dumped the rackful on him in ten lots. 
I looked O'VeT the side once in the dust 
And caught sight of him treading-water-like, 
Keeping his head above, •Damn ye, "I says, 
•That gets ye!" He squeaked like a squeezed rat. 
That was the last I saw or heard of him. 
I cleaned the rack and drove out to cool off. 
As I sat mopping hayseed from my neclc, 
And sort of waiting to be asked about it, 
One of the buys sings out, •Where's the old man 7" 
•J left him in the bam under the hay. 
If ye want him, ye can go dig him out. " 
That Frost found Burell's presence at Derry Farm an 
irksome reminder of his own incompetence as a farmer 
appears to be substantiated by the fact that he seized on 
the earliest opportunity, and the slimmest of pretexts, 
for pressuring Burell to leave: Carl was off working for 
the local road commissioner when he should have been 
working on the farm; Carl dido 't strain the milk properly; 
Carl pruned the fruit trees the wrong way (Thompson 277). 
What had been a long-time friendship between Frost and 
Burell, in short, thoroughly degenerated once it was 
transformed from a relationship between "just friends" into 
the more stressful terms of owner vs. worker. 
I don't intend to read some deep psychological 
significance into the troubled relationship between Frost 
and Burell. I do want to suggest, however, that their 
relationship offers an interesting example from Frost's early 
life of an ownership vs. labor conflict that was eventually to 
become commonplace in his art, a conflict nowhere more 
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They realized from the way I swabbed my neck 
More than was needed something must be up. 
They headed for the bam; I stayed where I was. 
They told me afterward. First they furlted hay, 
A lot of it, out into the bam floor. 
Nothing! They listened for him. Not a rustle. 
I guess they thought I'd spiked him in the temple 
Before I buried him, or I couldn't have managed. 
They excavated more. •eo keep his wife 
Out of the bam. "Someone looked in a window, 
And curse me if he wasn't in the kitchen 
Slumped way doum in a chair, with both his feet 
Against the stove, the hottest day that summer. 
He looked so clean disgusted from behind 
There was no one that dared to stir him up, 
Or let him know that he was being looked at. 
Apparently I hadn't buried him 
(I may have knocked him doum); but my just trying 
To bury him had hurt his dignity. 
He had gone to the house so's not to meet me. 
He kept away from us all afternoon. 
We tended to his hay. We saw him out 
After a while picking peas in his garden: 
He couldn't keep away from doing something. ' 
'Weren't you relieved to find he wasn't dead?' 
'No! and yet I don't know-it's hard to say. 
I went about to kill him fair enough. ' 
'You took an awkward way. Did he discharge you 7' 
'Discharge me7 No! He knew I did just right.' 
Robert Frost 
pronounced, nor more equivocally resolved, than in the 
poem reproduced above, "The Code." I should say at the 
outset that in what follows I have no wish to depreciate the 
role of the formative imagination in Frost's poetry. What I 
do hope to do is to make some modest suggestions about 
the working of that imagination in relation to common 
anxieties informing the culture in which Frost wrote. 
II 
Because Frost was a self-proclaimed partisan of the 
"traditional values" it would seem to follow that whenever he 
touched on the subject of work he was an uncomplicated 
and enthusiastic supporter of the idea that being a hard 
worker is a matter not just of economic necessity but of 
moral obligation. To think of hard work and moral virtue 
going hand in hand is of course a fundamental precept of a 
work ethic as handed down from a Protestant past and as 
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conventionally articulated by late 19th and early 20th-
century moralists. Difficult and wearisome physical labor, 
as Daniel T. Rodgers has summarized these views in his The 
Worlt Ethic in Industrial America: 1850-1920, "was the core of 
the moral life. Work made men useful in a world of 
economic scarcity; it staved off the doubts and temptations 
that prey on idleness; it opened the way to deserved wealth 
and status; it allowed one to put the impress of mind and 
skill on the material world" ( 14) . Virtually all of these 
presumably beneficial properties of work are treated 
somewhere in Frost's considerable body of poetry. Some of 
his better-known poems (one thinks immediately of such 
obvious examples as "Mowing," "The Tuft of Flowers," 
"Mter Apple Picking," "Mending Wall," "Two Tramps in 
Mud Time," and "Birches") feature characters for whom 
physical labor, either factually or figuratively, constitutes 
the essential terms of their moral reflection and humane 
worth. On the most accessible material level, and in 
severely practical and well-worn terms, diligent laborers are 
worthy of their hire, whether real or only figurative, and 
hard work is both a measure and a metaphor of the life 
well lived. In more abstract terms, work is a powerful 
creative/interpretetive activity, providing a joyous and self-
reflexive occasion to make some kind of conceptual sense 
out of material actualities-the "weight and strength" of the 
physical world, as Frost writes in "To Earthward." 
It has often been observed that the remarkable 
length of Frost's poetic career placed him historically in 
relation to an exceptionally broad range of literary 
influences. There has been little corollary 
acknowledgement, however, that the remarkable length of 
his career placed Frost in relation to a period of practically 
revolutionary change in the organization of American 
society. As Rodgers and others have recently confirmed, a 
particularly noteworthy aspect of this change had to do 
with the role of work as a critically-positioned meeting 
place between "fact and value." Even as Frost implicitly 
and others explicitly could extol the abstract moral values 
of the work ethic, they could hardly ignore the socio-
economic facts that in the industrial North-and, more 
pertinent in Frost's case, in the hard-scrabble rural 
Northeast-physical labor was often neither joyful nor 
conducive to moral development. In the rise of 
mechanization and the institutionalized factory system, 
indeed in the whole complex process of what Alan 
Trachtenberg has referred to as "the incorporation of 
America," labor was more often a mind-and body-numbing 
experience for the average worker than an occasion for 
peaceful, character-forming reflection. More often than 
not, the workplace was the place of conflict rather than the 
place where conflict was resolved. 
It seems natural to suppose that such themes could be 
treated more effectively in industrial settings than in the 
rural settings common in Frost's poetry. However, in tum-
of-the-century America the complex debate surrounding 
the subject of work was not confined to the factory 
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environment and it is certainly not confined to that 
environment in Frost's poetry. It must be remembered 
that in 1900 the rural population (sixty percent) of the 
United States outstripped urban population (forty percent) 
by nearly fifteen million (Douglas 183). It could be 
argued, and of course frequently was, that the concerns of 
farm owners and laborers therefore had an even more 
pressing claim for attention than the concerns of the 
largely urban factory system. Frost does at least twice deal 
at some length with the subject of the factory worker (in 
"The Self-Seeker" and "The Lone Striker") but he more 
characteristically transports his capital/labor concerns into 
a countrified setting that may be rural but is rarely pastoral 
in the standard sense of that term-certainly not "an 
enamelled world" of "untroubled rural delight and peace," 
as Raymond Williams has described the content of the 
classic pastoral form (18). Williams' term "counter-
pastoral" therefore seems an altogether more appropriate 
descriptor of that oppressive world Frost frequently renders 
in his narratives of rural working life. Frost's realist 
temperament often leads him to depict situations in which 
the implied existence of a wholesome labor ideal 
encounters unwelcome and stubborn resistance from a 
deeper, more objective recognition of the enervating 
circumstances in which labor all too often occurs. 
These circumstances were brought about, as Frost 
perceived (with some measure of reluctance), by 
fundamental transformations in the nature of capitalism in 
late 19th and early 20th century America. Moreover, 
Frost's sometimes conflicted attitudes towards the related 
subjects of capital, ownership, and labor were certainly not 
unique. On the contrary, his attitudes reflect widespread 
anxieties towards these culture-defining subjects, anxieties 
fueled by perceptions that evolution towards a mass-
production, mass-consumption society was rapidly 
changing the face of capitalism and changing it for the 
worse. In The Cultural Contradictions of Capitalism, Daniel 
Bell describes these critical changes as follows: 
In the early development of capitalism, the unrestrained 
economic impulse was held in check by Puritan restraint and the 
Protestant ethic. One worked because of one's obligation to 
one's calling, or to fulfill the covenant of the community. But the 
Protestant ethic was undermined not by modernism but by 
capitalism itself. ... The Protestant ethic" .... had worked to 
limit sumptuary (though not capital) accumulation. When the 
Protestant ethic was sundered from bourgeois society, only the 
hedonism remained, and the capitalist system lost its 
transcendental ethic. (21) 
No longer informed by "transcendental ties" or 
assumptions of "ultimate meaning," working relationships, 
in the period of transition between an "old" and a "new" 
capitalism, were rapidly being redefined in terms of 
efficient productivity and what Rodgers has called a "profit-
maximizing mentality" (53), a redefinition that almost 
inevitably resulted in a disharmony of interests between 
The Cresset 
owners and their laboring force. It is precisely this conflict, 
I will argue in what follows, that Frost dramatically renders 
in "The Code." 
III 
"The Code" opens harmoniously enough, with three 
men (an owner and two hired hands) working busily 
together to put up the hay before the storm approaching 
from the west arrives to ruin it. Shortly, however, this 
idyllic scene of cooperative industry is interrupted by the 
departure of one of the two hired hands, who walks off the 
job upset that the owner, a "town-bred farmer," has mildly 
hinted that he might work a little more quickly and 
efficiently. The hired hand who remains behind 
thereupon patiently explains that James has taken these 
hints as an insult: "'The hand that knows his business won't 
be told to do work better or faster.'" In pushing James to 
work harder, the owner-farmer has inadvertently violated 
an unspoken free-labor code of behavior by which workers 
retain their dignity by at least appearing to be what they 
almost certainly were not in fact: totally free, sovereign, and 
self-determined individuals and not mere hirelings or 
wage-slaves. In its earlier conceptions, the "strike," as 
Trachtenberg has observed (and that is what James is 
doing, striking), "represented a defiance of the cardinal 
norm of everyday [working] life: compliance with the 
authority of employers" (89). The second worker, who 
characterizes the now-departed James as "'one big fool,'" 
now proceeds to tell an elaborate story of how he once 
dealt with a contentious owner who attempted to introduce 
principles of "scientific management," the industry-
approved circumlocution for what appears in the poem as 
"hulling." 
This lack of sympathy on behalf of one worker for 
the other is worth dwelling on here, if only briefly. "'Most 
likely I'd have served you just the same,'" he says, but "'I 
know you don't understand our ways.'" This is a 
commendable sentiment, but it seems directly antithetical 
to what David Montgomery has described as a "spirit of 
mutuality" among skilled workers (and here skill amounts 
to "cocking hay" properly), who normally band together, 
or strike together, to ensure that in the face of the 
demands of scientific management to perform more 
efficiently they maintain control over their own work 
routine and pace: "Technical knowledge acquired on the 
job was embedded in a mutualistic ethical code, also 
acquired on the job, and together these attributes provided 
skilled workers with considerable autonomy at their work 
and powers of resistance to the wishes of their employers" 
(qtd. by Trachtenberg 92). Why the second worker (1) 
chooses not to walk off the job, but (2) decides instead to 
stay behind and tell his didactic tale, and why he (3) calls 
his fellow-worker a "fool" are problems we will eventually 
have to deal with. 
At first blush the poem (with this second worker 's 
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lesson in violence at the heart of it) seems little more than 
a laborer's tall-tale filled with the kind of humorous ego-
embellishments that we might naturally expect from such 
tales. But the deceptively comic surface of the poem fails 
to conceal an underlying current of deep hostility between 
ownership and labor, and one can hardly fail to be 
impressed by how far Frost has come from the '"Men work 
together,' I told him from the heart, I 'Whether they work 
together or apart'" sentiments of his earlier poem "A Tuft 
of Flowers." Men may work together, in "The Code," but 
they are certainly far apart in terms of latent class enmity, 
as abundantly illustrated by the hired hand's exaggerated, 
but no less illuminating, account of his attempt to murder 
his "bullish," slave-driving employer by burying him under 
a load of hay. 
"Weren't you relieved to find he wasn't dead 7" 
"No! and yet I don't know-it's hard to say. 
I went about to kill him fair enough. " 
What combination of cultural circumstances, 
frustrations, and imagined wrongs, it seems fair to ask, 
could have produced this heightened animosity? It is worth 
noting, in this context, that recent historical studies of the 
relationships between economy and culture in the rural 
Northeast have begun tocenter on refashioning our 
understanding of rural class conflict, or what Christopher 
Clark has referred to, perhaps somewhat euphemistically, 
as "the structures of opportunity in rural society." These 
efforts, for Clark, need to take into account the ways in 
which such material circumstances as "demography, 
property-holding, wealth-distribution and life-cycle effects" 
interact with such social circumstances as "cultural, 
ideological, and behavioral patterns, including what Uames 
A.] Henretta called mentalitis" (286). In his classic The 
Sociology of Rural Life, T. Lynn Smith is more helpfully 
direct in describing the typical situation of farm laborers 
and the kind of material and social circumstances that 
defined their status: 
In family farm areas the agricultural ladder is in operation, 
functioning as a social elevator to lift persons from the status of 
farm laborers, through the various grades of tenants, into the 
ownership and possession of the land they till. In such sections 
there is little that savors of the closed class system, little to 
array the classes against one another. 
But the situation is very different where there is 
concentration of ownership in the hands of a few. In this case the 
great mass of cultivators lack the security that comes with 
ownership of the soil. Vertical mobility is practically impossible; 
only a few can ever hope for the ownership of land; and the great 
masses are doomed to the permanent status of farm laborers. 
Inevitably this means a closed class system. It contains all the 
elements necessary for class struggle. ( 472) 
The situation Smith describes m his second 
paragraph brings to mind yet another of Frost's economic 
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casualties, the dying (and eventually dead) hired man, 
Silas, in "The Death of the Hired Man." As Mary says of 
him in that poem: 
" ... Nothing to loolr. baclr.ward to with pride, 
And nothing to loolr. forward to with hope, 
So now and never any different. " 
Though Frost does not establish their precise 
demographic situation in "The Code," I think it reasonable 
to assume that he intends the workers here to be no 
different from Silas. Like him, they are locked into a 
capital/labor class division with little hope of ever 
extricating themselves from it. Upward economic mobility 
may be a theoretical possibility for them but it remains 
fantastically improbable. Far more likely, in Smith's words, 
they are "doomed to the permanent status of farm 
laborers." 
But if it is indeed class struggle Frost is portraying in 
"The Code," it is class struggle of a curiously repressed 
kind. Why, if that is what it is, does the second hired hand 
not join his comrade, James, in walking off the job? Why 
does the second hired hand instead take such pains to 
instruct his employer in the protocol of labor relations? 
And why, at the heart of his instruction, has he placed such 
a violent exemplum? I suggest that Frost's dramatic display 
of conflict in "The Code" reveals his own deeply-divided 
attitudes and uncertainties in respect to the sometimes 
irreconcilable claims of ownership over against labor, 
economic progress over against personal dignity, the 
demands of cooperative productivity over against the 
demands of a laissez-faire individualism. The second hired 
hand operates in situ as the conservative Frost's cynically-
wise spokesman, one who acknowledges the divisiveness of 
class but recognizes as well that the code functions in a 
larger, systemic way to acknowledge, formalize, and defuse 
what would otherwise be a paralyzing and, to say the least, 
economically disadvantageous opposition between owner 
and laborer. 
James's "foolish" strike and the central narrator's own 
violent assault of his former employer ("'I'd as soon I 
Murdered him as left out his middle name.'") are best 
understood as extreme representations of what can occur if 
the code is not mutually observed. Even more to the 
somewhat didactic point of the poem, these incidents 
represent what must not be allowed to happen if the 
"system," whatever its imperfections, is to endure, a 
compromising sentiment that Frost would have found it 
difficult to reject out of hand. Just by giving the merest 
appearance of finding fault with one of his workers, the 
owner has violated that fragile behavioral ecology in which 
the opposing claims of ownership and labor, profit and 
dignity, achieve an efficient, productive, and system-
perpetuating equilibrium. The code in effect 
institutionalizes moral ambiguity, and openly acknowledges 
the absolute necessity of a functional class division, in such 
a way that expected and even legitimate capital/labor 
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conflict is, at least when the code is mutually observed, 
thoroughly suppressed. By elaborately masking conflict 
behind a facade of acceptable "ethical" behavior, the code 
insures a provisional, if deceptive, compatibility of purpose. 
From a slightly different point of view, the code makes up 
for what Bell sees as the loss of a transcendental ethic by 
substituting an entirely pragmatic or utilitarian one. It 
should hardly be surprising, then, that at the end of the 
second hired man's narrative, when he is asked if his 
former employer discharged him, he replies in some 
dismay: "'Discharge me? No! He knew I did just right.'" 
IV 
Near the end of his well-known essay "Deep Play: 
Notes on the Balinese Cockfight," Clifford Geertz attempts 
to explain why the Balinese, a people "shy to the point of 
obsessiveness of open conflict," should feature the 
cockfight almost as the central informing event of their 
culture, an event in which they "portray themselves as wild 
and murderous, with manic explosions of instinctual 
cruelty." Surrounded by stratified layers of ritual and 
carefully structured social meaning, the fight itself, Geertz 
suggests, comprises a "powerful rendering of life as the 
Balinese deeply do not want it ... set in the context of a 
sample of it as they do in fact have it." Though a 
cockfighting ring in Bali seems a long way from a hayfield 
in New Hampshire, one way to view the violent center of 
"The Code," with its surround of recommended 
cooperative conduct, is to imagine it too as presenting an 
image of working life as confrontation-an image of life as 
Frost and his narrator "deeply do not want it"-set in the 
context of life "as they do in fact have it," at least during 
this moment when they have been brought together in a 
bond of mutual understanding. What finally disturbs, 
however, is the obvious relish with which the hired hand 
recollects his story of violent class confrontation. As Geertz 
writes concerning the cockfight, "the slaughter in the cock 
ring [like a creatively envisioned encounter in New 
Hampshire, one might add] is not a depiction of how 
things literally are among men, but what is almost worse, of 
how, from a particular angle, they imaginatively are" ( 446). 
And how in an environment no longer informed by the old 
redeeming values, Frost appears to be saying in "The 
Code," they are likely to remain.O 
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Cicadas 
We learned about sex from Billy McLeary 
that summer of the seventeen year cicadas. 
We were seven, barefoot 
and sun blonde. 
Their mealy exoskeletons littered 
the sidewalk like strewn handfuls of dates. 
We saw them flailing in our breakfast cereal, 
dreaded a crunch into insect flesh, 
as if somehow our fruit 
could come alive. 
They crawled out of the seventeen year womb 
of our crabapple tree, 
scaled the highest twigs with twitching feelers 
and shrilled their cicada lullaby, 
a tinny drone over us 
in the purple-green August twilight. 
They skittered beneath our heels 
in our frantic flashlight tag till 
the streetlights glowed on 
and our moms called us home. 
Billy McLeary, seventeen and wise, 
told us all about it. 
About the white smudge 
on the underside of the girl-ones 
and some magnetic perfume 
that oozed from their bellies. 
We scanned the grass for pairs in piggyback, 
plucked them apart and tossed them at targets. 
And he laughed at us 
like he knew something else 
about the rustle of those bodies 
between the thick green blades, 
as if he heard words 
in their relentless hum. 
Barbara Fischer 
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'SENSITIVITY TO STRUCTURE': AN INTERVIEW 
WITH ARTHUR DANTO 
TK: A good starting point for us would be to have you 
reflect a little upon your career. You're both a highly esteemed 
philosopher, known for your work in the analytical philosophy of 
history, and books on Nietzsche and Sartre, as well as philosophy 
of art, and you're also now a prominent art critic for The Nation. 
Would you be willing to tell us about the connection of those two 
vocations, about how they come together? How did the 
philosopher Arthur Dan to become an art critic? 
AD: Well, all right, I'll be glad to talk a little bit about 
that. It's autobiography, naturally. Like most things in life 
it was an accident in one sense, but it was an accident I was 
prepared for. When I published the Transfzguration of the 
Commonplace my interest in that book was that it should 
really reach a world broader than the professional 
philosophical world. I had written a series of books of 
analytical philosophy and I didn't want to call it an 
analytical philosophy of art. I dido 't think that's what it 
was; I felt that the issues it addressed were issues of 
concern to artists and other people in the art world, and as 
a matter of fact, it fulfilled my hopes that it would reach a 
broad audience. It was widely discussed and reviewed in 
places like the Villa~ Voice and the Soho News and places 
where philosophy books don't very often get reviewed. 
That led finally to The Nation. The editor called me up 
one day, quite out of the blue, saying we don't know one 
VU philosophy professor Tom Kennedy spent five weeks in San 
Francisco this summer as a participant in the NEB-
sponsored summer institute "Philosophy and the Histories of the 
Arts." Perhaps no contemporary philosopher had contributed more 
to this discussion than Arthur C. Danto of Columbia University, 
who served as director of the institute. In his 1981 The 
Transfiguration of the Commonplace (Harvard University 
Press) and his 1986 The Philosophical Disenfranchisement 
of Art (Columbia University Press) and his current essays in 
philosophy of art and art criticism, he has argued for the 
importance of an awareness of historical context for understanding 
specifu: uxrrks of art as well as art itself Kennedy reports here on 
one of a number of conversations with Danto this summer. 
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Thomas D. Kennedy 
another, but we have friends in common and she'd read 
some things I had written. Would I be interested in writing 
for The Nation:? Now, in fact, I would have loved to have 
written for The Nation. It was exactly what I wanted to do 
but I had no way of doing it if somebody hadn't asked me. 
I certainly don't feel as though I could have gone to The 
Nation and said, "I'm Arthur Danto. I'm a well-known 
philosopher; I've written a book on the philosophy of art 
and I'd like to be your art critic." It couldn't have 
happened that way. And, in fact, when I published my first 
piece in The Nation they didn't even want me to sign it with 
my academic credentials. I simply was the author of The 
Transfiguration of the Commonplace. They were suspicious of 
academics. 
TK: But why should The Nation, or any magazine, care to 
have an academic-especially a philosopher trained in the 
analytic tradition of philosophy, serve as an art critic? Of what 
value could your training in philosophy be for that task? 
AD: Although I love writing art criticism I really love 
being a journalist too. I couldn't be the kind of journalist 
that I am ifl weren ' t a philosopher. I think that probably 
the art that I choose to write about in the first instance is 
work about which I can say something philosophical. I 
don't ordinarily write what one thinks of as reviews. I write 
essays on works or bodies of work that people are going to 
see but which have some kind of a philosophical bearing 
and I'm able to make that explicit, which gives me an 
advantage over a lot of art critics who don't have that sort 
of background when in fact a lot of the work that they 
address really needs it. A lot of art is more philosophically 
informed in certain kinds of ways than one realizes. For 
example, a lot of critics are formalists, particularly those 
that came up in the late 50s through the early 60s, those 
whose inspiration would be somebody like Clement 
Greenberg. They were primarily schooled to write about 
painting of a certain sort, painting that is visually gratifying 
painting you can analyze and judge as to whether it's good 
or bad. But so much of contemporary work isn't formalist 
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painting. Much of it is conceptual in ways that certain 
critics resent, whereas I'm very hospitable to it. I don't feel 
my job as a critic is to just talk about the work that appeals 
to me as an individual. I talk about the work that I think is 
difficult to understand; philosophy is very helpful in that 
way. So I think there are two things that I've been able to 
do which I'm grateful for. One is what I've just described, 
that is to say, bring in philosophy to bear on these works so 
that they yield up meanings to my readers that they might 
not have gotten just by seeing the show. But, more than 
that, I've given a kind of application to philosophy. In 
other words, instead of just writing for other aestheticians 
I've shown a way, I think, for aestheticians to write for a 
larger group. I'm gratified that my column has been so 
successful from that point of view. I mean, the proof for 
that sort of thing is whether you do have avid readers and 
The Nation has about 90,000 subscribers right now. And 
everybody who subscribes reads the magazine, so I'm 
writing for real readers. But the percentage of readers who 
have studied philosophy, I imagine, is relatively few-of 
college educated people probably most have had only one 
philosophy course. But, it is nice to know that our subject, 
our discipline, as it were, doesn't have to be restricted to its 
own practitioners. 
TK: It seems to me that most people would be surprised 
to think that theories about art and rich understandings of art 
could come from the analytic tradition. How do you see your 
work in the analytic tradition as contributing to helping people 
understand art? 
AD: Well, one of the great things about analytical 
philosophy is that it gives you a great sensitivity to 
structure, to the way structure holds together, to the 
architecture of thought. And, you can approach things 
from that kind of structural point of view with a discipline 
of analytical philosophy as you couldn't, let's say, if you 
were an existentialist. Heidigger wrote deeply about 
certain works, but he couldn't write about everything. 
He could write about Vincent's painting shoes, he 
could write about a Grecian temple and so forth, but 
Heidigger couldn't be a reviewer. I couldn't imagine that 
kind of thing happening. He wrote about those and only 
those things that fit his metaphysics. And same with Sartre, 
who wrote one of the best essays ever written on art. He 
wrote an essay on Giacometti, but they were personal 
friends and he was able to fit that into some of the issues 
about perception and consciousness that he was interested 
in and he was able to write about Tintoretto from the 
perspective of being a political rebel. But, I don't think 
Sartre could have written about everything in the way in 
which somebody who has taken on the responsibility of 
writing a column has to do. There's a kind of universality 
and almost impersonality about analytical philosophy 
which makes it a wonderful discipline for somebody who is 
going to take on any body of discourse and see how it holds 
together and what are the logical points of connection 
within it. I found no difficulty in applying that to painting. 
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Of course, like any professional philosopher, I do know a 
certain amount about the history of philosophy and I've 
been able to draw on that when it's seemed appropriate. 
Now and again I bring in Hegel or Heidigger or Sartre; I'm 
always grateful for my training as an analytical philosopher. 
As I say, it has enabled me to do a job that another kind of 
philosophy wouldn't be able to do. 
TK: Certainly one of your best known pieces in recent 
years is the essay "The End of Art" which appears in The 
Philosophical Disenfranchisement of Art. I think many artists and 
people who are familar with art would at least be puzzled, if not 
outraged, at your suggestion that art has somehow ended. What 
were you trying to get at in "The End of Artr' 
AD: I think of that essay as a liberating rather than a 
depressing piece, but before I published it, when I 
presented it to groups of artists, I think that initially they 
were relatively hostile. When they saw what I was getting at 
they found it a very reassuring idea. What I said was that 
we are at the end of a certain model of art history-a 
progressive model of art history-and a certain obligation 
that that model placed on artists to be historically correct. 
We now have the notion of political correctness but the 
notion of historical correctness, of doing the right thing at 
the right time and not doing the wrong thing at the right 
time, that obligation is something that someone who grew 
up in the New York art world as I did would be very, very 
sensitive to. The times when people would say "You can't 
do this, you've got to do that. We can no longer do the 
figure, we can no longer do .... That's sentimental. That is 
literary. That is decorative. That is reactionary." All those 
kind of things. Artists who didn't want to toe this line of 
"art-historical correctness" were on the constant defensive. 
I thought that that model of art history had really come to 
an end and it came to a natural end. 
I do think the structure, the history of art, was 
defined by that model from about 1300 down to about as I 
like to say the middle 1960s-maybe 1970, I'm not exactly 
sure-where the artist felt his or her task to be to carry 
forward art in a way not at all unlike the way in which 
scientists think of it as their role to carry forward knowlege, 
the conquest of the world, the translation of the world into 
cognitive equivalencies. Artists were required to do that as 
well. I thought that probably that notion ends when art 
finally begins to recognize what its own philosophical 
nature is. That's what I was talking about. I talked about it 
in connection with Andy Warhol, primarily, and the Brillo 
Boxes. In my book about what philosophy is, Connections to 
the World, I try to show that all philosophical problems, at 
least in my view, have a common form. You've got two 
things belonging to radically different categories that look 
exactly alike and then you've got to say in what the 
difference consists. I think that Warhol, and possibly 
before him Duchamps, had finally seen that that was the 
problem of art. Once you realize what the philosophical 
nature of art is, then it's up to the philosophers to carry 
that on if they want to; artists are liberated to really do 
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anything that they care to do. That is to say, we're living in 
an age of extreme pluralism which is very healthy I think 
and very good. I wrote a piece for The Nation last year 
where I said, "Well, we're into the 90s. What are the 90s 
like?" I talked about six shows that I had liked particularly, 
artists that I felt were extremely good. Then I asked myself 
what have they got to do with one another? They belong to 
the times but they don't all belong to the same school. As 
a matter of fact, it would be difficult to think of six more 
different artists than the ones who happen to have had 
shows early in 1990. That is the way in which art moves 
now, in what I call this "post-historical moment." I never 
thought that art was something that would stop. I thought 
only that a story which had been the moving engine of the 
production of art had ended. That had come to a natural 
closure with the philosophical uncovering of art as a 
philosophical entity. I hope that doesn't sound too 
obscure. 
TK: So artists are liberated from certain historical 
demands upon them? 
AD: That's right. 
TK: Are there other demands yet upon the artist that 
they're not liberated from, say, moral demands? 
AD: I do think that in a lot of cases, these days 
particularly, a lot of artists feel that they ought to be doing 
something through the art in connection with the causes 
that concern them as moral beings. I think particularly in 
the period when Greenberg had his ascendency, in the 
great period of abstract expressionism, artists did turn their 
backs on moral issues. They thought that it was absolutely 
enough to be a hero of art and that's all art should be. It 
should be kind of pure, and it was arduous to make great 
art, to make pure art and there was no other kind of thing 
that they cared to do. Now, I think that if you're liberated 
you really are liberated, so that it's perfectly possible for 
artists to do whatever they want to. I would hate to see a 
situation where politics became an imperative the way 
history became an imperative before. I think that if my 
views have any coherence, then if you are liberated you 
really are liberated and if you want to be a purist you can 
do that, abstractionist if you want to be an abstractionist, a 
minimalist if you want to be a minimalist. You can also be 
any one of a number of different things, so there's no one 
thing art's any longer obliged to do. But in that earlier 
period you had that sense of incredible focus where you 
thought the business of art is to make art and to advance 
art in the direction of discovering its essence. The history 
of art was almost like the history of alchemy. It was an 
effort to distill out what the essence of art was and I think 
they thought they were very close to it in a way. 
TK: To continue with the idea of the liberated artist, is it 
ever appropriate for society to say of a given artist that we expect 
your art, if not to conform, at least not to conflict with certain 
mores of this society? 
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AD: Perhaps you have in mind something like the 
Mapplethorpe issue. Not our society. We do have a free 
society and I think that if we subsidize art we have to 
subsidize the freedom of the artist. Let me put it this way. 
As you know, I'm terribly impressed with certain thoughts 
of Hegel and in particular Hegel's wonderful idea that in a 
sense philosophy, religion and art are all what he called 
moments of absolute spirit. Art is philosophy in another 
guise and philosophy is religion in another guise and so 
forth. I think that if we think of it that way and if we think 
of religion seriously, religion is nothing but strife--nothing 
but strife. If you've got religion you've got heresy; it's just 
inseparable from the idea of religion. If you're going to 
have freedom of religion you've got to have freedom for 
strife, and in a free society that translates back into art. If 
you've got art, you've got to expect that you might, if 
you're supporting it, have to support something that you 
would be as opposed to, as you find yourself opposed to a 
religion that's alien to your own. Or, in philosophy I think 
where the differences finally are so extreme that there's no 
possibility of reconciliation, we just have to live with it. 
Differences are not as intensified in philosophy as they are 
in religion or as they are in art. We celebrate our political 
values in supporting art that's offensive to the community. 
That seems to me absolutely appropriate. 
TK: To continue your analogy with religion, the 
institutions of religion have a way of dealing with heretics-maybe 
ignoring them, maybe saying we won't support you, maybe 
something more drastic than thaL In light of that analogy why 
wouldn't it be appropriate for a community to say "Well, we will 
not prevent you from doing art; go ahead and do your arL But, if 
you violate our deepest beliefs and values you have no claim to 
our support. 
AD: Ah, there is an interesting question as to why the 
American government should support art in the first place. 
I think probably we support it because we feel that it's got a 
kind of spiritual value and we feel a great need for it. It was 
not a need the framers of the Constitution felt. The 18th 
century was a very different time. But in the 20th century 
art has increasingly become something people are 
concerned about; it does represent a need. On a 
liberalized view of what a government should be-let us say 
government should take care of the needs of its people-
supporting art in one form or another is very natural. 
There is a need for art because there is a need for a kind of 
secular spirituality. The proliferation of art museums is a 
kind of evidence for that. I read the statistic that in the 
early 1960s a new museum opened on the North American 
continent every three or four days. Every three or four 
days! So we have something like twenty four or five 
museums per million population in the North American 
continent. The proliferation of museums is like the 
proliferation of cathedrals in the Middle Ages. If, as I 
believe to be true, art has a kind of spiritual value, then 
there is a spiritual value in having it, and the museums for 
it, even if you disagree with it. 
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TK: As a nation, are we sufficiently well-educated to 
support and sustain the proliferation of museums that you just 
mentioned? 
AD: Let me put it this way, there is this problem for 
sure: museums are built by cities or communities that have 
an educated populace to begin with. No question that 
there are a lot of people who don't have that kind of 
education, although through a lot of outreach you bring 
people into the museums now, art enters the media in so 
many different kinds of ways. The incentive for coming to 
the museum is stronger than it used to be. When I was a 
kid, for example, the art museum was a place thatyou 
entered with a sense that youprobably didn't belong there. 
It's like a man entering a lingerie shop--you're not quite 
sure it's your place at all, you feel almost expelled. Now 
museums are much more open and I think the design of 
the contemporary museum reflects that fact. Very few 
people feel alien to the museum. For one thing there are 
things that people can feel comfortable with right away. 
There is the cafeteria, there is the gift shop and then, of 
course, there is the art which makes it all meaningful, but 
it's possible for people to enter the familiar first. It's 
symbolic that the Boston Museum of Fine Arts, which is 
beautiful-it's a McKim, Mead, White structure, I think, 
anyway, from the gilded age, a great temple-like building-
had a new wing designed by Pei and it's very modern 
indeed. Now, that's where you enter the Boston Museum; 
you don't enter through those columns, through the great 
portal, you enter it through the glass structure which looks 
almost like a shopping mall. And you see the gift shop and 
you see the restaurant and the place where you buy 
earphones and then you enter the museum and then it's 
got its own shows. In the new wing is where people have, 
for example, the great Monet show, "Monet and the 
Nineties, "-the serial paintings were shown , and so forth. 
But it's a portal, apertura as the Italians say, an opening to 
the community. The consensus is that it's a very good 
thing that children should be brought in, that other people 
should be brought in whatever their antecedent degree of 
education would be, and it would be a great shame, I think, 
if museums were only for the educated. Obviously, the 
more you know the more you get out of it, but there has to 
be something that everybody can get Our times are like all 
times. Parents are concerned with their children, that the 
children should have richer lives and that art should be 
part of that 
TK: We, as philosophers, worry a bit whether students have 
enough background in philosophy when they graduate from 
college. What's the minimal education students should have in 
art in order to understand and appreciate visits to museums, to 
understand, for example, contemporary art? Is reading The Nation 
enough? 
AD: (laughing) No, I don't think reading The Nation 
is sufficient for anything. I don't know that students read 
The Nation, but let me go back since it's come up again. 
That magazine is written, is read, by well- educated people; 
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they may not be professionally educatedintellectuals, but 
they are intellectual. I try to write about shows that they're 
likely to want to see, mostly about shows that they're likely 
to go see when they come to New York. I feel a 
responsiblity to give them a body of thought about the 
show that they can react against. They are already 
relatively well educated, already in the habit of going to see 
exhibitions of a certain sort. They're not likely to haunt 
the galleries in Soho, and they're certainly not likely to go 
to the East Village to see art up-and-coming there. They 
may be uncomfortable about art galleries in the way in 
which I was describing people being uncomfortable in 
museums, at a certain point, because galleries are fairly 
seedy places and you're not sure you really do belong 
there. But in museums they do feel comfortable, and it's 
just part of their idea of what life is like-going to movies 
or reading certain books. They're not going to read all the 
books; they may, as a matter of fact, unfortunately, just 
read the top forty literature, but they do read. For them to 
understand art, then, I guess what you need is whatever the 
equivalent of the top forty would be for art What would 
that be? I mean you want some sense of works belonging 
to different periods and what it means if they belong to 
different periods. You have to understand when the period 
is or isn't "real." I think you need a certain amount of 
knowledge of history. 
I would like to think that you needed some aesthetics 
or philosophy of art, but I'm suspicious of a lot of 
aesthetics in part because it's so ahistorical, and I feel that 
knowing history is important for knowing art There are 
lots of myths that people tell about paintings and painters. 
I think some acquaintance with some biographies of artists 
is a good thing, even though they're a little bit mythic. It's 
nice to know what the reception of the work was, what the 
obstacles were, those kinds of things I think are a little bit 
important. It would be nice to read a little bit of 
philosophy, but then I think you'd have to read relatively 
contemporary philosophy because I don't think that the 
philosophers of the past, with the exception of Hegel, (and 
you couldn't ask people to read that because it's so 
obscure) were particularly good on art. I don't think Kant 
was very good on art, I don't think anybody was much good 
on art. But I think that the philosophers of our present 
time really are. I guess the best thing would be some kind 
of an adequate art history course so you at least get the 
sense of progression of different periods. Probably 
acquaintance with different cultures is a good thing as well, 
and then it's a good thing for people to know that you 
can't apply the same criteria to African art or Oceanic art 
or Chinese art as you do here. Those probably would be 
the two things that would be best done. 
TK: What's the role of the art critic today? Is it just 
providing background information evaluative assessments to help 
us in appreciating works of art? 
AD: I think Robert Hughes of Time magazine said 
most critics are cheerleaders, that is to say, they've got 
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certain artists that they support and they try to advance 
them. I don't have any agenda at all. I do see my role 
primarily as explanatory. I try to give some sense of how 
you would make a judgment-that's not so easy. An awful 
lot of critical judgments are judgments in the form "that's 
not art," but I don't think such statements are very useful. 
I'm very open; I never condemn anything that flat out 
because it's in the wrong category, it doesn't conform to 
somebody's criteria of what art is, and so on. I think that a 
philosophically adequate definition of art has to be so 
abstract that it fits anything anyway, so I feel that what is 
necessary is explanation and some indication within a 
category of how you might talk about something being 
better or worse than something else, more successful, less 
successful than something else. I couldn't see any other 
reason to be an art critic and I wouldn't have much 
confidence in an art critic who simply made evaluative 
judgments without going into some serious explanation; I 
think from that point of view what a critic would be doing 
would be teaching by example, trying to get people, first 
off, to see that the works really do need explanation, what 
Richard Wollheim was saying when he talked about 
understanding the meanings of artworks. They don't wear 
their meanings on their faces. To get people past "that 
looks like my butcher" or "that looks like my Aunt Hilda," 
or "that looks like" or "that reminds me of" or something 
like that, get past that and start looking at things and try 
and see what they do mean. I think if you got that-what's 
it mean?- you would have gotten a lot. Then against that 
you might say yes, I see what it means, and then the 
question "is it successful or not?" inevitably rises. 
So critics should be paradigms for people who go 
into shows. I used to do a great deal of drawing. I no 
longer do it, but I used to draw when I travelled. I'd draw 
the things that I saw. I felt that was the way in which I'd get 
to understand art. I call it analytical sightseeing, that is to 
say, I would take things apart on the paper. I really felt that 
was very rewarding. I could understand a baroque church 
by drawing it in a way in which I couldn'tjust by looking at 
it. I often thought it: would be a good thing if people went 
home and wrote pieces of art criticism themselves, tried to 
form ideas and write about art, to think about it from the 
perspective of having it published almost. I think it would 
greatly enhance people's ways of going to shows because 
for the most part we just go in and grunt and groan. We go 
in and we say, " Oh, you know, that's beautiful," or '\vow," 
or something like that. If everyone tried to do some art 
criticism, a lot could be gained. 
TK: Is there some obligation of an artist to respect her 
audience? 
AD: Recently there was a work of Katie Nolan's that 
was made of beer cans, Budweiser beer cans and cutouts of 
Lee Harvey Oswald and Patty Hearst and so forth. I 
thought the symbols were obvious, that she didn't do more 
than put them together and beyond that she took up a 
great deal of space. I mean she took up about a sixth of 
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the entire top floor of the Whitney Museum. I thought all 
that space for that message- she didn't do enough. I 
don't think she respected her audience. I think she just 
aggrandized all that space. I thought it was a little bit 
insulting to the audience, not because it showed 
insufficient technical skill but insufficient artistic skill. 
There's a difference. The artistic skill consists in putting 
together your symbols in such a way as to have a certain 
kind of impact. One felt that this was a thin work even 
though it was enormous, and I thought that was the 
consensus. Most people thought that way about that 
particular work. There were many things I think in that 
show that were scary and frightening and you thought 
about them afterward but hers I just thought about as a 
disappointment, and a failure. 
TK: You say you're not a cheerleader for various artists but 
who are your favorite artists currently? Who are the ones who 
most enrich you, personally, the ones you most appreciate? 
AD: I love Cindy Sherman's work, for example. I 
find her astonishing. I love Mark Tansey's work, I think 
that's wonderful. I like Robert Mangold's work. They're 
all very different artists. Cindy is a photographer; Mark 
Tansey is a realist and an allegorist of a kind. Mangold is 
an abstract artist. Those are all artists that I like. Most of 
the artists that I like best don't have much success. I mean 
those are people who keep alive the art of painting, which 
I think is what I personally am most responsive to. There's 
a deliciousness in the way in which they paint. In 
California, I think an artist like Wayne Teabow is a 
delicious artist, I mean the way the paint goes on, it's 
almost edible, edibly good. I love art of that sort in my 
deepest self but I would never see myself as a critic just 
being an advocate or cheerleader for that kind of art. I 
take it that that's my taste. The artists I first mentioned are 
extremely successful at it and altogether beyond my means. 
I'm not sure I want a Mark Tansey particularly when those 
are large public works and they belong in large important 
collections. If I buy anything it would be a small painting. 
TK: If the history of art has ended then I suppose any sort 
of predictions about the future of art are nonsense, that anything 
will go. 
AD: The periods where people were prepared to say 
anything goes were periods of intense philosophical search, 
as a matter of fact, they were exploring limits. I think the 
age of exploring limits is now pretty much over, trying to 
find out what the limits are. Once that's over with, once 
that's something you're leaving more and more to 
philosophers to think about, then I think art becomes 
inevitably richer and deeper and more conceptual. It's got 
a different mission than the exploration of limits, if you see 
what I mean. It can become quite unpredictable. We, a 
number of us, were talking about this artist at the Berkeley 
Museum, Rosemarie Truckle, a German artist, a German 
feminist conceptualist. I don't think anybody would have 
anticipated any of the works that are in that kind of show. 
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TK: What is there left for philosophy to do? You know what conceptual art is, you know what feminist 
art might be, you know who's a German, but that the art 
itself is quite surprising, not on the principle of "anything 
goes," but the fact that against a background of anything 
goes she can put things together in such a surprising way. 
Sometimes they shock, sometimes they surprise, sometimes 
they move. They always arouse thought, in any case. I 
think that is great, a great kind of thing. What I like is that 
you don't just think about it as a breakthrough in the 
history of art simply because it is almost, I think, that 
maybe the visual arts are getting to be more like literature 
now. You're not expecting people to make breakthroughs, 
you just expect them to write humanly satisfying works and 
I think something like that might be happening with art. 
AD: To define art, I mean to really solve the problem 
of what is art. I think that is what philosophers now must 
do that they couldn't have done until art was ready for it 
because they dido 't know how that history was going to go. 
Now that the history has shown the philosophical nature of 
art, what we've got to do as philosophers is put it together. 
I think in the Transfzguration of the Commonplace I went some 
distance towards that, and I think to make the next move is 
staggering. I don't know that I'm up to it, I don't who is up 
to it. There's a lot to do if you're a philosopher. Q 
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I Have Nothing Rising 
A candle's light can rise above a candle. 
Its body, always subject to the flame, 
Glides up to join the fire 
Or down-escaping. 
But I'm no light. 
I have nothing rising and warmer 
Than my body, 
Which has set on its bones 
And won ' t flow freely 
When the burning starts. 
For ifl held my finger in the flame, 
My flesh could never melt away to safety 
Nor stand the pain. 
So I can't put my spirit above me, 
And I touch nothing of 
Greater intensity 
Than this thin skin 
That will finally roll away 




THINKING ABOUT ART 
Arthur C. Danto. Encounters & Reflections. Art in the 
Historical Present. New York: Farrar Straus Giroux, 1990. 
356 pp. $22.95. 
Some people have all the luck. Not only do they 
think and write very well, they get to think and write about 
what they love-in this case, about great works of art. 
Philosopher Arthur Danto of Columbia University enjoys 
the added distinction of an exquisitely perceptive eye. All 
of which makes his art criticism a joy to read. But like most 
good thinkers, Danto's work is animated by a deep tension, 
one that moves restlessly throughout this collection of art 
reviews since 1986. 
After repudiating the search for a "pure distilled 
essence of art," Dan to provides a defmition of art which 
recalls the idealist tradition of essentialism: 
... language achieves the status of art when our sentences 
embody the ideas they express, as if displaying what the 
sentences are about. A picture becomes art when, beyond 
representing its idea, properties of i tse If become salient in the 
work of embodiment. (~9) 
As propositions go, these two are elusive. What they 
mean hinges on the significance of ' embodiment.' If art 
somehow visualizes ideas, gives visible form or body to 
something within us, how does this occur and what is it that 
gets embodied? Danto isn't clear on the mechanics (or 
metaphysics?) of representation. But then, brief columns 
on art criticism are not exactly the place to pursue such 
concerns. As for the nature of the idea that becomes 
embodied in the work of art, it would seem that Danto 
operates with a broad understanding: it could be passion, 
David Morgan teaches in the Department of Art and in Christ 
College at VU. Interested in varieties of expression, particularly in 
the relations between art and the spiritual, Morgan has begun a 
long-term project on the work of Warner SalZman and its reception 
in the religious community. His last piece in The Cresset was on 
the works ofVassily Kandinsky in May, 1991. 
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insight, imagination, historical consciousness, even 
philosophical discernment or intuition in the case of 
Danto's favorite painter, Andy Warhol. Or, to raise the 
spectre of Dan to's chief philosophical affinity in this book, 
is what finds embodiment in the work of art something on 
the order of Hegel's Geist? Although he makes several 
metaphorical references to the Spirit at work in history (at 
least one assumes they are metaphorical), evolving toward 
absolute embodiment or supreme self-expression, Danto's 
chief location of Geist is in the human person. The work 
of art, as the embodiment of an idea, "parallels the way in 
which our minds are embodied in· ourselves as persons" 
(9). It is not reason that art embodies, not pure being or 
the ideal essence of anything-except perhaps the essence 
of humanity. When art attempts to visualize reason, it 
reaches its end, as Hegel argued, and as Danto fully agrees, 
because it leaves its bailiwick; it seeks to do the work of 
rational thought, not visual expression (where expression is 
understood as the virtually sacramental act of transforming 
what is within in to something that is without). 
Hegel saw the history of art as an essentially spiritual 
movement; Danto likewise experiences art as a spiritual 
affair. He recounts an aesthetic rebirth of 1985, when he 
saw the work of the Japanese painter, Chuta Kimura: 
I had, I realize, grown disenchanted with beauty. I had 
thought too long of painting in terms of the philosophical 
questions it raises, as if art were a dislocated form of 
philosophy itself. Kimura brought back to life for me the 
irreducible and unanalyzable powers of painting in its highest 
vocation. (117) 
Danto goes on to describe his "first encounter" with 
Kimura's work. "In truth, one felt in the work the radiance 
of a religious joy, next to which the ordinary pleasures of 
even a happy life have barely any weight. Kimura's 
relationship to his art must have been close to that ecstatic 
engagement with a radiant reality one reads about 
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occasionally in the literature of mysticism" (ll8). Dan to's 
art criticism evokes motifs of contrition, illumination, and 
transcendence found in the autobiographies of mystics. 
The attentive reader cannot miss the numerous instances 
of mystical and sacred metaphor in the author's rich and 
evocative writing. "The first time I saw David Sawin's work, I 
felt myself to be in the presence of something irresistible, 
like a nimbus, self-contained in its intense illumination, 
which drew and held me with a force like love" (21). It is 
impossible to look at Abstract Expressionist Robert 
Motherwell's Spanish Elegy 132, Danto proclaims, "without 
feeling oneself in the presence of some human revelation 
as deep as painting allows" (195). Cezanne, Motherwell, 
Morandi, Kimura: "These are all masters of incandescence, 
that presence in their work of something as difficult to 
characterize but as easy to recognize as spirit, which is 
there independently of the discoveries that have earned 
some of them places in the history of art" (21). 
The assertion that a work of art, or the beauty in it, 
transcends time and place gained a wide currency in the 
eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries with the rise of 
aesthetics and the proclamation of genius as the prevailing 
force in artistic creation. These developments were linked 
to the Enlightenment's postulation of a secular spirituality. 
Sacred art, ensconced in the practices of institutional 
religion, was replaced by the 'spiritual' in art, and the path 
from Hegel's Geist to Kandinsky's das Geistige ensued. The 
chief characteristic of the spiritual in art is timelessness or 
transcendence. And if there is one thing Danto wishes to 
impress upon his readers, it is that the greatest art is 
timeless, absolute. Goya and Courbet transcend mere 
periodicity, they are for all times, as is the work of 
Michelangelo: "We flock to the Sistine Chapel not to be 
informed as to the values of the sixteenth-century popes. 
We go to be touched in our essential universal humanity" 
(327). To the same end, Dan to militates against the social 
construction of such concepts as · genius and masterpiece 
and sees them as transhistorical, absolute. He wishes the 
term 'masterpiece' to designate absolute and universal 
value in a work of art The masterpiece, he writes, "must 
express humanity ... "For his notion of 'humanity' and 
'genius,' Danto goes to the Enlightenment and the French 
Revolution (see the insightful and fascinating article 
entitled "Masterpiece and the Museum"), and thereby 
proclaims his ties with the tradition of a secular spirituality 
whose deepest concern is to transpose the sacred 
mythology of transcendence and revelation to the secular 
terms of spirituality. 
The residues of sacred ritual are quite apparent in 
Dan to's critical response to art. In a review of an exhibition 
of Sienese painting at the Metropolitan Museum of Art, 
Danto writes of a particular panel of St. Thomas Aquinas: 
"We are drawn in, our feelings are aroused, our curiosity 
awakened. Like everything else in this extraordinary 
exhibition, this picture addresses us as participants rather 
than as witnesses-as if we were among the faithful rather 
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than mere visual judges-enlarging rather than reducing 
those for whom it brings messages of great assurance and 
joy. It is a show you cannot see too many times." It seems 
only appropriate, of course, that the philosopher-art critic 
should find this icon of the patron saint of Christian 
philosophy particularly numinous. But one wonders if 
Danto's enlightened search for universals in sacred art 
doesn't amount to the same appropriation (read: 
stripping) of it which seems so justly offensive in the 
Western (ab)uses of African or Asian art. Can Christianity 
or any other religion be so neatly demythologized, its true 
spiritual essence distilled from its incidental sacred 
character, its concrete historicity-all in the interest of 
attaining a universal humanity? What happens to its 
irreducible and mysterious strangeness that Danto is so 
keen to preserve on a personal level in his experience of a 
painting by Correggio? 
There .is a certain internal strangeness to the painting that 
remains once one has worked through the external 
strangenesses that inevitably separate us from the work of a 
very different time. It is like the mystery possessed by someone 
with whom one is perfectly familiar. Surrender yourself to 
that, if you can ... (93) 
The work of art opens up a new world, Danto 
suggests-but he inherits such rhetoric from the 
Napoleonic imperialism of the Enlightenment, the will to 
encounter new worlds by invading and occupying them. 
The Enlightenment project assumed that everything was 
accessible to reason, every boundary penetrable to the 
restless probing of the indomitable human spirit. All 
difference is cancelled by virtue of the universality of 
human reason and curiosity. The construct 'humanity' 
served as a warrant for global imperialism-in the interests 
of universal human curiosity, of course. 
Danto ends his book with a fascinating essay that 
brings Hegel's diagnosis of the end of art to bear on art 
since Hegel. According to Danto, art reaches the end that 
Hegel discerned when it turns to ponder its own existence, 
at which point it ceases being art and becomes philosophy. 
Modernism in art is this concern for self-definition. Danto 
is unsure whether to date this in the second half of the 
nineteenth century or sometime in the early twentieth, but 
he finds the issue of self-definition "expressed in its purest 
philosophical form" in Warhol's Brillo boxes, exhibited in 
1964, which pose the question "why something should be a 
work of art while something altogether like it should not" 
(343). By 'end of art', Danto does not mean anything so 
silly as the termination of all artistic production. The end 
of art, in his view, occurs with the direct embodiment of 
ideas in form. The end of art is announced when art is 
used to illustrate something which is foreign to its nature, 
when art becomes only a means of illustration, when its 
surfaces become impervious to the idea that formerly 
animated the work of art. Warhol's Brillo boxes or 
Duchamp's signed urinal pose the question 'what is art?' 
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rather than elicit a traditionally defined aesthetic 
experience. But, in contrast to Danto's thesis, the 
'philosophization of art' is not part of an inexorable 
historical progression as Hegel believed. Art has often 
worked on the cusp of other modes of discourse. Allegory 
has linked the visual arts with literature and philosophy; 
performance has joined art with opera, theatre, and dance; 
craft has inserted art into the rhythms of daily life; ritual 
has bound art to religion; propaganda has placed art in the 
service of the state. In other words, 'art' is forever testing its 
limits or having them tested. Art is always being defined, 
redefined. The end of art is perennial. 
that Danto's disdain for Greenbergianisrn amounts to a 
desire to secure the legitimacy of an aesthetic rooted in 
such quintessentially Enlightenment concepts as 
'humanity', 'freedom', and 'universality.' Greenberg's 
formalism, it would seem, leads to the end of art, which, 
however it may intrigue Dan to the philosopher, is not what 
engages Dan to the art lover. In the fmal pages of his book, 
he writes that artists can free themselves from the practice 
of art-as-philosophy simply by ceasing to search for the 
essence of art, at which point they will be liberated from 
the determinism of history and enter a posthistorical age of 
freedom. Once freed from the historical imperative of 
working out the Spirit's self-expression, artists will enjoy the 
opportunity to create as if ex nihilo, without a past 
impinging on them, and will therefore create once again 
timeless, absolute works of art. What Danto seems to be 
saying is that transcendence and epiphany are not lost to 
art. It's a rather facile fiat he pulls on Mr. Hegel, but 
understandable given the author's commitment to 
preserving the secularized spirituality and metaphysics of 
the Enlightenrnent.O 
Despite his intellectual fascination with Warhol, 
Danto argues for an art beyond the modernist end of art. 
He joins many in announcing the death of modernism and 
derides Clement Greenberg's formalist art criticism, which 
had hailed the self-defining tendency in modernist art. 
Since it was Greenberg, in a well-known essay entitled 
"Modernist Painting," who traced this impulse to the 
critical self-consciousness of Kantian philosophy, it may be 
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The Face That Told Her Nothing 
"This is what I'll do," she told her mother. 
"I know who I am." So she went with him, 
and when the winds died down and water sluiced 
through at the corner of the garden where 
the land tipped toward the bottom, they went 
to the pasture in boots and he told her 
how it would be now with no crops corning in. 
Back in the kitchen she got dinner ready, 
watching from the window for the men to 
come up from the fields, and listened 
to the news that said the creeks were out 
and bridges were down, to stay out of 
the country. 
So she watched him eat with the others, 
their shoulders hunched over their biscuits 
and gravy, and at night held herself stiffiy 
between cold sheets and watched the moonlight 
on the heavy chintz curtains she had from 
her mother, hearing the rain in the rain gutters. 
Then she would go to the window and press 
her body against the glass, hard and cold, 
until her face disappeared in the dark rain-
the face that told her nothing now. 
J. T. Ledbetter 
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How Do We Get to 
Grover's Conters? 
Charles Vandersee 
Every now and then the last few 
months the word citizenship enters my 
mind, for no reason. "What is this?" 
I'm asking myself. Why is this word 
coming down, no meaning attached, 
no explanation? 
Does it connect with something 
local? The University here in 
Dogwood is sometimes charged with 
"not being a good citizen." For one 
thing, it put up a whopping medical 
center not made of familiar red brick, 
a porcellaneous city unto itself, which 
some people call ugly. 
Also, the University attracts 
students, who have outdoor parties. 
Plastic and paper litter the 
neighborhoods. Someone may 
urinate on a private flower. Partyers 
turn up amplifiers, and not just on 
weekends. 
But citizenship didn't seem to 
connect with nuisances . Our 
apprentice drunks and white medical 
temple aren't all that offensive. We're 
heavily into tradition here, and 
town/gown chafing is one of the 
traditions. 
Citizenship also wasn't arriving 
from reading. I don't poke around 
much in the two dark and hazardous 
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structures called political theory and 
moral reasoning. Rawls, Lasch, 
Nozick, Alasdair Maclntyre-are those 
some of the names? My mind can't 
deal with this kind of erudite 
architecture. 
A few years ago I did read Habits 
of the Heart, when everybody was 
reading it. It has stories and people. 
The word citizenship must have been 
there, though I don't recall. Last 
summer a student I know pretty well 
had an internship in Washington with 
Amitai Etzioni, professor at George 
Washington University, and his new 
magazine The Responsive Community, 
in teres ted in people helping each 
other locally, through strengthening 
volunteer institutions (churches, 
charities). At least this is what it 
sounds like-one kind of citizenship, 
possibly. 
The 1992 presidential campaign 
didn't seem to be the source of these 
citizenship blips. Newspaper stories 
haven't been using the word. A 
magazine profile finally fixed in my 
mind a single fact about Clinton, and 
not a useful fact: He's from one of 
the two states in the Union that one 
never, ever thinks of (the other being 
Idaho). Otherwise, he sounds like just 
another Rhodes Scholar running for 
office since cradledom, not a citizen. 
And no one ever called the current 
White House occupant a good citizen, 
so far as I recall. 
Had citizenship come up in old 
school days? Doubtful. We heard 
about the three-part division of the 
federal government, and a vague 
obligation to vote. But small-town 
wisdom outside the classroom 
contradicted the latter piety. All 
politicians were the same, wisdom 
said, and while no one was going to 
take your job away if you voted, you 
better not make a big deal about it. 
So I dun no. I ask myself and get 
no answers. Being careful not to ask 
too hard-if presidents and 
presidential candidates aren't 
necessarily good citizens, maybe I'm 
not one either. Good citizens are 
supposed to watch Meet the Press, for 
example (or maybe a postmodern 
show with a clashier format-isn't 
there one called McLaughlin's 
Motormouths1). But here in Virginia all 
these air on Sunday morning between 
ten and noon. Maybe for citizenship 
every narthex in the state needs a wide 
screen. 
Citizenship is hard to figure out, 
and also non-citizenship. At the 
university in Dogwood, we still have 
too few African American students 
(does that say something about 
collective citizenship?), but one of 
them came in a week or two ago to get 
a recommendation. My favorite type 
of student: wry, well-read, loves to 
write, full of miscellaneous 
information, easy to banter with, 
ambitious but not cramming for the 
presidency since cradlehood. As we 
talked, he mentioned Jonathan 
Kozol's new book, which I haven't 
read: about inequality in American 
schools, because suburbs have lots of 
money while inner cities and 
Appalachian valleys don't. Nobody 
has figured out what to do, and 
nobody cares; is this an example of 
non-citizenship? 
Also, the NIMBY syndrome of 
recent years. Nuclear plants and waste 
dumps and housing projects-
needed, but Not In My Back Yard. Is 
all this stuff going underground in my 
mind and surfacing with these little 
blips, like small bubbles of waste from 
Love Canal, this word citizenship over 
and over, unattached to anything? 
Because, no kidding, this has really 
been happening. 
And not, as I mentioned, 
because I especially think about these 
matters. Jonathan Kozol I admire, 
from a host of books, especially Death 
at an Early Age, read years ago. I'm 
glad he's an angry man, also Ralph 
Nader (is Ralph Nader still alive?), 
and I'm glad Etzioni is stirring up 
some new thinking. Maybe these 
people are exemplary citizens. 
Yet I really don't know, but the 
other day the word came up yet again, 
with a slightly new angle. It was 
Catharine Stimpson using the word, 
one of the country's fine ladies, a 
literary scholar, dean at Rutgers, 
recently president of the Modern 
Language Association. This is the 
organization that English professors 
belong to, as doctors belong to the 
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AMA. The MLA has been attacked 
lately, especially the year after 
Stimpson's term, when it protested 
the nomination of Carol Iannone to 
the council of the National 
Endowment for the Humanities. 
Iannone, an adjunct professor whose 
publications are mostly partisan essays 
in a conservative monthly, Commentary, 
isn't all that much of a scholar, said 
the MLA. Lynne Cheney, head of the 
NEH, retorted that the MLA just 
didn't want a conservative on the 
board. 
It was a review of that battle, 
fought in the media, that Stimpson 
presented in one of her two lectures 
here. It was arranged by our 
Commonwealth Center for Literary 
and Cultural Change, where I'm 
helping out this year. Included in the 
battle rhetoric, Stimpson reported, 
was a right-wing attack on Phyllis 
Franklin, head of the MLA, for being 
a worse threat to the U.S. than 
Saddam Hussein. On the ground that 
internal "culture wars" in the U.S. are 
more serious for America's future 
than wars with any foreign dictator. 
The NEH battle and the Gulf war were 
being fought at about the same time. 
Oppositions within the American 
culture have in recent years been so 
fierce and deeply felt (abortion, 
pornography, prayer in the schools) 
that "war" is actually an apt metaphor. 
It was after her account of the 
fierceness over this one appointment 
to the NEH board that Stimpson 
paused to suggest that in the America 
of the next few years the question of 
citizenship is going to be a major issue. 
Sitting at her side, as moderator 
for this brown-bag lunch session, I 
pricked up my ears. Here was the 
intrusive word, unsought and 
undisclosing. Stimpson's concern was 
that all the cultural issues have 
become dichotomized, and that every 
single issue now generates a full-scale 
war. All issues have only two sides, 
and all issues are matters of life and 
death. She began to suggest (but had 
to stop, to catch a plane) that 
citizenship must be a capacity for 
moving beyond the dichotomous and 
out of full battle dress. Citizenship 
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means something other than giving 
every issue two and only two sides, 
picking one, then going about 
bludgeoning. 
Well, I didn't know what to make 
of this, and still don't. I call a lot of us 
good citizens here at the university, 
because we do our work well, and the 
work is beneficial to others. We hate 
fights, and mistrust Manichaeans. But 
is this enough? 
Talking with the student 
needing a recommendation, I 
dragged out one of my favorite points, 
not too passionately, I hope: that 
literary study -the reading of novels 
and plays and poems-is really the 
only effective way of nurturing the 
imagination. The imagination, that is, 
moves a person for hours at a time 
into someone else's experience and 
consciousness. Movies and 1V dramas 
can give you experience, but they 
can't fully deal with consciousness: 
desires, motives, fears, construals, and 
illusions. My further point was the 
nurturing of the imagination is 
necessary in order to feel what it's like 
to be a part of a nation. I.e., a citizen. 
You can read magazine articles 
and see TV documentaries, and be 
moved and enlightened, but an 
author who takes you inside the actual 
mind of a sharecropper or CEO is 
what's finally wanted. A mind, with its 
motives, is an evolving construct, 
responsive to all kinds of things that 
happen, and in two or three hundred 
pages of things happening you 
actually learn about that mind. 
You would not necessarily 
forgive-as Graef Crystal, once adviser 
to CEOs on how to rake in millions, 
now campaigns, unforgivingly, against 
bloated salaries. But you would have 
insight into how individual human 
beings chose their respective wars, 
what it's like to have strong feelings 
and reject compromise. You then 
might resist calling every 
provocateur-Jesse Helms or Robert 
Mapplethorpe-a bearer of the 
Apocalypse. 
Feeling that you know a bunch 
of minds in the nation, you might ask 
how the nation belongs to each, and 
thus begin conceiving citizenship. 
Still, all this seemed beside the 
point. Not faithfully reading 
campaign news, or watching 
Bushbashing and Buchananbaiting on 
1V, or spending much time in culture 
wars, I felt somewhat comfortable in 
aloofness, since I'm not sure people 
should pretend to understand what 
they don't, and the hierarchy of 
important issues in this year's election 
is not at all clear to me. Nor do I have 
a vision of the possible sustainable 
America, some structure of virtue we'll 
all look at with self-yielding affection. 
As part of this year with the 
Commonwealth Center, I organized 
some book discussions for the public, 
at the new branch library in the 
shopping center. Our research 
fellows at the Center each chose a 
book, as did I, on the theme, "No 
Turning Back." The book I chose is 
by my favorite anarchist, Henry Adams 
("Conservative Christian Anarchist," 
he called himself): his anonymous 
and rather bitter novel of 1880 titled 
Democracy. I began the session by 
hazarding that the U.S. in our time is 
very likely ungovernable (being too 
large and complex), but that people 
in Adams' time did hope it was 
governable. He thought democracy 
virtually a failure, but advised no 
turning back, because monarchy and 
totalitarianism were worse. 
For Adams, corruption was the 
problem, and he thought that maybe 
corruption could be stanched. Today 
corruption remains a problem, the S 
& L bandits quite matching any 
barons of the Gilded Age. But there 's 
a big difference; we have a mammoth 
federal debt, also an overwhelming 
mass of data and opinions impossible 
for a legislative staff to sort through, 
to reach wise judgment on matters 
that come before House and Senate. 
So all appropriations bills are by 
definition bad, because they add to 
the national debt. And on general 
policy issues most votes yield "no win" 
situations. Voting for fiscal restraint 
means an economy in doldrums and 
people losing jobs; "stimulating the 
economy" means assaulting the 
environment. 
Local and state governments do 
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have issues one can get one's mind 
around, but the nation itself cannot 
be governed. This does not mean 
collapse, since a nation doesn't have 
to be governable to survive, but it does 
raise the question of what any of us as 
"citizens" might usefully do, in and for 
the nation. 
That big citizenship question 
obviously isn't answered by saying that 
each of us should be content locally 
with doing our little best. Or that we 
need a vision only our leaders and 
would-be leaders can provide. Or that 
we have to replace wars and polarities 
with an effort to reason together. 
Perhaps what I'm looking for is a 
wholly new intervention in national 
culture, produced not by a sociologist 
or a visionary or a politician, or a 
Fulghum or an Adams. It would have 
to be a story, I think-a work of art It 
would have to be a video cassette-
despite its overty, TV is our one 
universality, and a video is in reach at 
any hour. The story too has to be 
within our reach: not soap opera, alos 
not a lofty and classical ideal. A story 
about people, who are recognizably 
building some sort of structure, but a 
story eschewing the tedious and 
unconvincing moral language of 
community and society, and neighborhood 
and bond. 
Perhaps without language at all, 
a cassette story with acts and images 
that would entice equally in to its 
sacralized rectangle the drug dealer 
and the CEO, the too-sure 
fundamentalist and all driven 
treadmillers. 
Then, perhaps, there would be a 
day in the year when the government 
did not show up for work, and schools 
were empty and silent, as everywhere 
at the screen people write themselves 
into the story's future, preparing to 
emerge into the sun, artists, rested, 
with their new scripts for a nation 
whose parts are willing to coexist just a 
week at a time. 






and Super Salaries 
Michael Becker 
"How can anybody be worth that 
much money?" he says, looking up 
from a newspaper. Or maybe without 
props, just his mouth descending to a 
frown. A lively conversation begins in 
any neighborhood bar or faculty 
lounge in America. He doesn't need 
to say more or even respond to 
questions. Someone will focus the 
argument. Ryne Sandberg, Arnold 
Schwarzenegger, or sports or movie 
stars in general. More and more these 
days the talk runs to chief executive 
officers of major corporations. 
Presidential candidate Jerry 
Brown says that astronomical salaries 
and providing jobs for Mexicans are all 
corporate executives are interested in. 
Some congressmen are suggesting that 
corporations should not be allowed to 
deduct salaries in excess of some 
maximum. Will Greider, writing on 
tax legislation in Rolling Stone says, "If 
business is going to get tax breaks, 
Congress should impose some new 
rules. For instance, no company 
should be eligible if its executives are 
enjoying scandalously high salaries 
and bonuses." Some of these people 
may even be serious. 
There's a lot more of this kind of 
talk recently. It's because of the 
recession. One economic theory says 
satisfaction with one's wealth is more 
related to the person's wealth in 
relation to that of others than to the 
absolute level ofwealth. To be able to 
keep up with the Joneses is a satisfying 
thing regardless of what the J oneses or 
I happen to make. As people are laid 
off or threatened with layoffs they feel 
less wealthy relative to others and are 
less satisfied and begin to complain 
more. 
In the 1950s well-orchestrated 
oligopolies in many American markets, 
automobiles and steel for instance, 
made high profits and provided high 
wages and salaries for their employees. 
Concern for the consumer was 
somewhat cavalier as we look at it 
today. That happens when 
competition is limited. There was no 
foreign competition except for sports 
cars and watches. But in time foreign 
competitors learned to produce 
acceptable products with employees, 
workers and executives both, earning 
less than in America. They offered a 
lower price and took market share. 
Eventually they developed superior 
products and took more market share. 
To stay in the game American firms 
had to lower production costs. They 
demanded and received wage and 
benefits freezes, sometimes even 
givebacks. Why hasn't this happened 
to the executives at the top? Their 
compensation has risen while hourly 
workers and middle management 
compensation has stagnated or fallen. 
A countertrend has been at work. 
Explaining today's high 
compensation for corporate CEOs, 
and likely part of its cause, is the 
development of agency theory in 
financial economics. This is the idea 
that business owners, if they are 
unable to manage directly their own 
business, must rely on agents. To 
assure that agents carry out the 
owners' objectives, certain costs must 
be incurred. These include costs of 
audits, costs of larger and more 
competent boards of directors to 
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oversee CEO activities, and 
compensation plans designed to make 
executive and shareholder goals more 
nearly congruent. 
CEOs, like everyone else, have 
personal agendas which are not always 
matched to the goals of their firm's 
shareholders. To achieve congruence 
of goals, corporations make CEOs into 
shareholders, rewarding them in stock, 
and providing stock options and bonus 
plans tied to performance of the firm's 
shares. To avoid CEOs. focusing only 
on short-term performance in order to 
maximize their bonus for the current 
year, compensation plans have been 
developed to reward longer term 
performance. The theory suggests that 
CEOs are given more compensation 
now, not because they work harder but 
because they pursue goals more closely 
allied with those of the shareholders, 
namely increasing shareholder wealth. 
This has led to embarrassing situations. 
High bonuses are achieved in a year of 
low profits, layoffs in this country. 
That was 1991. These do not seem 
desirable results to the average person, 
including newspaper business section 
reporters who may be concerned about 
layoffs themselves. They ask why 
CEOs get rewarded under such 
circumstances. The answer is that 
creating American jobs, or withholding 
jobs in Mexico, or making short run 
profits are not what CEOs' employers, 
the shareholders, want them to do. 
Shareholders are interested in 
increased dividends and/ or rises in 
stock prices. That's pretty much it. 
The stock market is up. It is not 
illogical that CEOs' compensation in 
general is also up. 
Not all stock returns are up 
however. And the lowering of interest 
rates may have more to do with some 
stock price increases than CEO 
performance. Incentive compensation 
plans never do work perfectly, whether 
designed to motivate hourly workers or 
the uppermost executives in the 
corporation. Incentive plans are 
intended only to increase the degree 
of overlap between worker and 
company or shareholder goals. 
Should self-serving shareholders 
be allowed to award "scandalously high 
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compensation" to executives who 
ignore the "needs" of the country? 
Who are these selfish shareholders 
anyway? Well, they are us for one 
thing, we who hold cash values in 
insurance policies and shares in 
mutual funds and interests in pension 
plans, our savings for down payments 
on homes, college tu1t10n, or 
retirement. The College Retirement 
Equities Fund (CREF), which is where 
many of us on campus keep retirement 
savings, held $34 billion in its stock 
account at the end of 1990. I haven't 
seen the 1991 figures yet, but the stock 
market rise must have brought 
considerable increases in CREF 
investment values. Personally, I am not 
planning to request a reduced pension 
because American CEOs mainly 
pursued shareholders' (my) interests 
in 1991 in stead of a goal of full 
employment in America. Included in 
CREF stock account, by the way, is $4.5 
billion (about 13 percent of the total) 
in investments in foreign corporations 
and governments. This suggests that 
college professors aren't much in to 
"Buy American." 
If American CEOs were somehow 
pressed into service in behalf of a 
national goal, creation of American 
jobs for instance, even though the goal 
might clash with shareholders 
interests, how much could they do? 
The American edge that some critics 
blame U.S. executives for losing is, or 
was, a monopoly on technology and 
resources. The monopoly resulted 
partly from hard work by Americans, 
and partly from accidents of history. 
Like any form of organization, 
monopoly is subject to entropy. No 
one person and no one country can 
command disproportionate shares of 
the world's wealth forever. Attracted 
by the promise of economic reward, 
others find ways to compete. America 
can work hard and improve itself, but 
it will enjoy a continually diminishing 
piece of the world pie. Is it possible 
that managing a U.S. firm when world 
trends are against us is more difficult 
and deserves more reward than in that 
economic paradise of the 1950s? 
The 1992 election year theme of 
"American First" is fueled by nostalgia 
for a time long gone. The Yugo 
automobile should make us think of 
the first Japanese cars to hit our shores. 
We didn't think much of them either. 
You can bet that Yugo executives have 
heard all of Johnny's and Jay's jokes 
and are working on the problem. 
Competition in the next century, for 
America and for Japan, will come from 
places like Nigeria and Paraguay and 
the Ukraine. And at some point such 
countries will figure out how to build 
some product we want with better 
quality and a cheaper price. 
Speaking of Japan, it has been 
much noted that Japanese corporate 
executives' salaries are smaller than 
those of their American counterparts. 
Are Japanese executives therefore less 
loyal to their shareholders? It seems 
otherwise. Japanese executives are said 
to obtain from their culture a greater 
regard for their employer and for their 
fellow employees than is the case for 
their American counterparts. The 
Japanese executive probably obtains a 
greater respect and admiration from 
his culture as well. He could hardly 
obtain less. Respect can be as 
satisfying as high pay. Critics suggest 
that Americans should emulate these 
more altruistic aspects of Japanese 
culture. Why? To sell more products 
and to take jobs away from foreigners. 
If Japanese executives are more 
competent than Americans and work 
for less money, why don't American 
corporations just hire them? Cultural 
differences, not wanting to be first, 
racism, who knows? If the economics 
remain strong it will happen. U.S. 
Automobile companies started buying 
Japanese steel twenty years ago because 
it was superior in quality and cheaper. 
IfJapanese executives are also superior 
in quality and cheaper, it is only a 
matter of time until they are hired. It 
won't be popular. American 
executives being replaced by Japanese 
will find sympathy in an unlikely 
place-blue-collar workers who have 
felt or fear the same fate. The likely 
result of such increased competition 
for CEO jobs will be the lowering of 
top executive salaries. 
On the other hand, would a 
Japanese take an American CEO's job? 
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Satoshi Iue, President of Sanyo 
Electric observes in Business Week 
[March 30, 1992] that American 
executives spend more hours on the 
job than many executives of Japanese 
concerns. "My feeling is that 
American company presidents work 
extremely hard and are under a lot of 
stress. If I had to work in America, it's 
quite possible I'd want to be 
compensated like an American." The 
Business Week article from which this 
comes advocates lower compensation 
for top executives. 
The bigger trend of business 
internationalization may cause our 
scenarios to play out in slightly 
different ways. It may be a fifty 
percent Japanese owned General 
Motors that employs the first Japanese 
CEO. It may be the merged Ford-
Mitsubishi-Volkswagen Corporation 
that builds the first automobile in 
Nigeria. These are not popular things 
to think about in the "America First" 
election year of 1992. Maybe trends 
toward internationalization will be 
halted. And maybe General Motors 
will get back their former fifty plus 
percent of the American automobile 
market. And maybe Wayne 
Campbell's scenario involving those 
flying monkeys will take place. 
The values behind the whole 
executive reform argument seem a 
little skewed. The objection seems to 
be that executives are paid more than 
they are worth. But it seems to be OK 
for people to have more than they are 
worth, those who inherit wealth for 
instance. Is this a new version of "old 
money is superior to new money" 
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argument? And what about people 
who win lotteries? Aren't they getting 
more than they deserve? 
Maybe we can think about this 
thing in another way. Top executives 
of top firms work extremely hard, 
harder than any sports or movie star 
ever dreamed of. Say they get a base 
salary of a million dollars or so. Say 
they can make another million or so 
by superior performance for their 
shareholders. But they also get a 
lottery ticket which pays off really big, 
tens of millions say, if some rather 
unlikely things happen to the 
economy or the corporation or its 
competitors. Would that be fair? In 
effect this is pretty much what actually 
happens, I think. 
USA Today tells us [March 27, 
1992] that on this issue "the hoopla 
isn ' t likely to fizzle soon." This is a 
strange statement for a newspaper 
where the hoopla usually fades before 
the ink is dry. I think the hoopla will 
fade, maybe even before the fall 
elections. People will get tired of it. 
Cool heads will prevail. No laws will 
limit compensation. such laws would 
put most professional ball clubs out of 
business, for one thing. And once 
employment picks up, people will have 
a lot less to resent 
There is a government approach 
to pay inequity that has been used to 
good effect in the past. Remember 
the graduated income tax? Not the 
wimpy version we have now, but the 
one where really well-off folks were 
placed in a 91 percent tax bracket. 
Ninety-one percent! Later the highest 
rate was reduced to 50 percent. Now it 
is 28 percent The last reduction was 
achieved when Ronald Reagan traded 
away a host of pro-business tax laws. 
Now Bush wants the pro-business tax 
features back (capital gains tax, 
investment tax credit, lower minimum 
corporate tax, passive losses on real 
estate), but without reinstatement of 
higher tax rates for the rich. Will 
Greider thinks he may get his way. I'm 
not so sure. Bush may have made a 
colossal error in vetoing the recent tax 
bill (Democratic) which would have 
reduced most people's taxes in 
America at the expense of the richest 
one percent. A Democratic White 
House and Congress is possible in 
1993. Hoopla over the rubber check 
issue will be gone before the election. 
A tradeoff of steeper graduated rates 
for return of some of the pro-business 
tax features Reagan gave away is likely 
no matter how the election goes. It 
would have happened already if it 
weren't for "read my lips." 
A self-evident corollary to Jesus' 
saying about the poor is, "The rich you 
will always have with you." Can we try 
not to be so hard on high-earning 
CEOs? Clearly such people do 
something quite uncommon to earn 
their money. What would we do 
without them? Remember how Dante 
reserved a special place in purgatory 
for princes who were so busy doing 
their jobs of ruling that they didn't 
attend to their own salvation. Dante 
gave them a second chance rather 
than sending them straight to hell. 
Can we be similarly compassionate to 
corporate execu tives?O 
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Friday, the Thirteenth 
For this day when Eve carried fruit 
To the willing mouth of Adam. 
For this day, years later, when Noah 
Set sail on the eraser flood. 
For the morning when the builders 
Spoke a thousand tongues in Babel. 
For the crumble and collapse, 
This noon, of Solomon's temple. 
For the death, before dark, of Christ, 
All the Bible's subsequent bad luck. 
For the moments of ice or water 
Or ill-judged curves which swerve our cars. 
For the vague ache, for the fierce pain, 
Misery arriving on the phone. 
For the day some of us were born. 
For Friday whose number we whisper. 
For anniversaries which turn us 
Toward our caves, the thigh bones we brandish 
When the family fire blinks out 
And we rise fierce with growl and roar. 
Gary Fincke 
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Finding Life in the 
Movies 
RoyM. Anker 
In his very remarkable book, 
Awakenings, neurologist Oliver Sacks 
recounts his long work in the 1960s 
with sufferers of post-encephalitic 
Parkinsonianism, a bizarre disorder 
that physically immobilizes or freezes 
its victims for decades, usually barring 
them from self-expression and 
rudimentary communication. For 
these forgotten souls, lost in "abysses 
of affiiction," surprising in warehouse-
like mental hospitals, Sacks initiated 
treatment with the the "miracle drug" 
L-dopa (xxvii). The results, as the 
book's title suggests, were nothing 
short of amazing. Sacks' recounting of 
the medical origins and workings of 
the disease transfixes the reader 
(Sacks' book was a best-seller of sorts), 
but ultimately more is afoot there than 
high-tech therapy and super-doctors. 
For as much as Sacks is engrossed and 
expert in detailing causes, symptoms, 
and consequences of this puzzling 
disease, his chief fascination is with 
what he calls "the full needs and 
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feelings of patients" and the 
"landscapes of being in which these 
patients reside" both of which he 
deems worthy of "metaphysical 
attention" (xviii, xix). After all, as 
Sacks claims, it is to the patients 
themselves, as individual stricken 
people, and decidedly not as medical 
challenges or ingenious cures, has 
fallen the task, "through no fault or 
wish of their own," of exploring the 
unimaginable "depths, the ultimate 
possibilities of being and suffering" 
which life harbors (273). And in these 
journeys came great ecstasies and 
desolations, barely fathomable by 
residents of conventional health and 
"normalcy." In the end all Sacks knows 
is that the usual storehouse of medical 
pathologies, mechanistic in the 
extreme, do not begin to account for 
the wonders encountered by his crew 
of sufferers. 
A like sense of profound wonder 
and amazement, of a "metaphysical 
attention" approaching enchantment 
before the mysteries and potentialities 
of life, is these days finding its way 
into, of all places, a few Hollywood 
releases. Perhaps the most notable of 
these, although maybe not the most 
satisfying, is the film versions of Oliver 
Sacks' book. This past winter 
appeared Meg and Lawrence Kasdan's 
sober and reflective Grand Canyon. 
Very much a middle-aged film, so to 
speak, it scrupulously explored notions 
of meaning and, believe it or not, such 
terms as "miracle" in response to the 
ragtag banes and blessings of ordinary 
life . The effects of everyone's 
psychological detritus got their due in 
Bar bra Streisand 's adaptation of Pat 
Conroy's Prince of Tides. Perhaps such 
scenarios make good fodder for 
screenplays, or the yuppies of the 
nation have reached a fit age for 
contemplating themselves, their 
mortality, and "what it all means." 
Whatever the case, the news these 
filmmakers report is that, surprise, life 
is an exquisite and irreplaceable gift, 
so replete with meaning and delight 
that its contemplation elicits nothing 
so much as deep gratitude. 
The trouble is that over and over 
again in these films, as maybe in real 
life, it takes the fearsome prospect of 
death (or some close kin thereof) to 
provoke even minimal apprehension 
of life's inmost nature. Indeed, and 
sad to say, war and sickness have 
historically proven the best agents for 
instigating a life-loving metaphysical 
embrace. In war films, as in Oliver 
Stone's Born on the Fourth of July, 
dominant emphasis has usually fallen 
on the horrors of war that imperil the 
goodness of the ordinary. More often 
we run into tales of illness and death, 
no doubt because these subjects are 
regular and constant, and these stories 
seem to set out fuller portraits of 
health, a nebulous condition whose 
real benefits we fail to appreciate until 
we totter on the brink of loss. If the 
hard truth be known, then, it often 
takes pain and death to scare life and 
jubilation into us. The scary prospect 
of pain and death can bring light and 
gladness to spirits dark or numb, as 
was the case with Tolstoy's Ivan Ilyich. 
For most everyone, only the jolting 
confrontation with illness and 
mortality proves sufficient to alert one, 
down to socks and soul, to the 
inexpressible glory of ordinary human 
life and love. As in the Divine Comedy, 
the soul-self has to go through hell to 
find life abundant. And that, to be 
sure, is not a bad trip for any book, or 
as we have here, two flicks derived 
from books, films that really shake 
people up--both on the screen and in 
the seats. 
The film Awakenings is, as it says 
at the outset, "based on a true story," 
and as a whole it illustrates well what 
Hollywood thinks it must supply to 
keep an audience: namely, increase 
mystery and romance so the story 
looks a lot like, to put it somewhat 
harshly, "the miracle worker goes on a 
date" or "medical sleuth finds 
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romance. " It is surely clear by the 
evidence of this film that Hollywood, 
that amorphous money-making crew 
out in earthquake land, does not think 
commonplace experience of reality of 
sufficient interest to hold anyone's 
attention for very long. There is in 
this attitude both poverty of soul and 
enormous condescension toward 
ordinary people who they deem 
incapable of mustering sensible 
understanding of the import of their 
own lives. With Awakenings, there is 
some irony in this, for it offers a good 
example of how far Hollywood, not 
trusting its own instincts (and a lot of 
other people's money), will go to dress 
up a fUm whose very "message" argues 
vehemently against any such approach. 
Both the book and the 
screenplay take us to the humble 
confines of the ward for the 
chronically insane at Mt. Carmel 
Hospital in New York City. Here all 
the heroes-to-be have been in various 
stages of sleep for many years, 
sometimes decades. The film follows a 
withdrawn and socially inept 
psychiatrist and brain researcher, Dr. 
Malcolm Sayer (Robin Williams), who 
seems to be some facsimile of Oliver 
Sacks. The shy shrink signs on to work 
in a hospital because he cannot find 
laboratory work and is ill-suited for 
regular "people work." To enhance 
viewer interest still further, the 
filmmakers make Sayer a brilliant 
diagnostician who cracks the whole 
riddle of a peculiar catatonia manifest 
in a variety of patients. In fact, the sort 
of knowledge he comes across in the 
film had long been established, but 
having Sayer come upon it makes the 
whole story more dramatic(a lot like 
Oliver Stone in .JFK compacting the 
work of countless assassination 
investigators into the oration of Jim 
Garrison). However, as Sacks himself 
applauds, the film does excel in its 
portrait of the victims of a "post-
encephalitic disorder of far greater 
complexity, severity, and strangeness" 
than had before been imagined 
possible, for while bodies fell 
immobile, minds remained 
unimpaired (xxx). 
Between 1916-27 some five 
28 
million people suffered sleeping 
sickness, and some few of these 
developed, often years or decades 
later, acute Parkinsonianism. The 
book fully details the horrible physical 
consequences of the disease but is 
more concerned with the victims' 
experience of their own disease and 
what happens under L-dopa. 
Again, differing from the book 
for the sake of drama, the film casts 
the patients as completely unreachable 
and unexpressive, and it is Sayer's 
good fortune to discover a full and 
remarkably sane mental life behind 
their silence. After Sayer's medical 
sleuthing tracks the mysterious cause, 
the strange aftereffects of encephalitis, 
the film begins to assume its full 
measure of poignancy as Sayer 
struggles to reach the healthy minds 
that he alone suspects are merely 
locked in a mysterious mental prison. 
Firm in his hunches, he seeks his 
superiors' grudging permission to 
experiment with a wonder drug for 
victims of Parkinson's disease, a 
common neurological disorder that 
destroys muscle control. He first tries 
L-dopa on Leonard Lowe (Robert 
DeNiro), who in the film had fallen 
"asleep" in his teens and by 1969 had 
been so for thirty years (actually he was 
almost thirty when hospitalized and 
had just about finished a doctorate in 
literature at Harvard; throughout his 
illness he was able to read and 
communicate by indicating letters on a 
small letter board). 
Miraculously, in both film and 
book, under the medicants of L-dopa, 
Lowe emerges to full healthy 
consciousness and in a short time 
attains what seems to be complete 
normalcy. He plunges into life with 
relish, as if to make up for lost 
decades. On the basis of Lowe's 
recovery, Sayer wins permission to 
treat others with L-dopa, and they too 
blossom like long-dormant flowers 
brought into the light. Amid all these 
abundant miracles of recovery (again 
compacted in the film), Leonard 
becomes something of a prophet to 
normal folks, including Malcolm 
Sayer, who takes for granted much of 
the grand gift of life. Leonard lives 
and preaches the sheer goodness and 
"wonderment" of life in ordinary 
things-friends, walks, books, and 
even romance. And so do his 
awakened compatriots, although they 
seem to have more trouble accepting 
the loss of so much of their lives and 
loves. Surely these are the most 
striking moments in the film, but they 
pale before Leonard's exquisite savor 
of being as captured in Sacks's prose: 
Everything about him filled him with 
delight; he was like a man who had 
awoken from a nightmare or a serious 
illness, or a man released from 
entombment or prison, who is 
suddenly intoxicated with the sense 
and beauty of everything round him ... 
Mr. L. was drunk on reality-on 
sensations and feelings and relations 
which had been cut off from him, or 
distorted, for many decades. . .. He 
read the "Paradiso" now~uring the 
previous twenty years he had never got 
beyond "Inferno" or "Purgatorio"-
with tears of joy on his face; "I feel 
saved," he would say, "resurrected, re-
born. I feel a sense of health 
amounting to Grace ... I feel like a man 
in love." ... [the] diary which he started 
to keep at the time was full of 
expressions of amazement and 
gratitude. (208-09) 
Words, it seems, venture only so 
far, and while the film evokes the 
same, it hoards cinema's resources in 
evoking Leonard's new life, however 
brief it proved to be. While its 
portrayal is moving, director Penny 
Marshall's rendition of Leonard's new-
found ecstasy of being is sadly very 
tame. The screenplay and the director 
might have presented far more of 
Leonard's radical embrace of the 
gladness of ordinary being. In any 
case, the tale progresses, and for 
Leonard and the others, the new 
bright flame of being flickered and 
then very painfully ebbed as the drug 
lost its potency. After two weeks on L-
dopa, Leonard began to suffer 
countless side-effects from the drug. 
These calamities ranged from assorted 
torturous body spasms to paranoia and 
all-consuming lust, the latter two 
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psychological distresses entirely 
neglected by the film. For these 
reasons, Leonard would eventually opt 
to eschew further experimentation 
with wonder drugs. Having had his fill 
of glory and misery, he would, so to 
speak, live quietly. 
Awalrenings sets forth its portrait 
of human interconnectedness very 
nicely. As chronicled by Sacks in an 
appendix to the 1990 edition of his 
book, Robert De Niro mastered, with 
scholarly persistence and acumen, the 
demanding role of Leonard, and 
Robin Williams managed to submerge 
his effervescent lunacy into the shy 
physician. The story moves nicely, 
although it feels contrived as the 
movie makers labor to imbue the tale 
with, as Sacks describes it in his book, 
"the emotion, the excitement, and 
with something akin to enchantment, 
even awe" that it possessed in real life. 
Those who have read the remarkable 
original account by psychiatrist-writer 
Oliver Sacks, the model for Sayer, will 
no doubt be disappointed not with the 
film's desire to capture this mood but 
with the irksome predictability of its 
sentimental strategies (overdone 
music and photography, to name two). 
Nonetheless, this quiet film sets 
forth a remarkable story, and on top of 
that, dares to tell audiences, albeit 
tamely, what that story might mean. 
That is, we should care for one 
another, even when impractical; that 
life comes full of surprises; and that 
life was meant to be something good 
and grand, full of relish, delight, and 
gratitude. Admittedly, this implausible 
scenario resembles the sort of fanciful 
stuff that comes in fairy tales. 
Nonetheless, contends Sacks, "real 
life" at times does hold real surprises, 
sad and glorious ones alike. The 
marvel of Awakenings as film and book, 
especially the latter, is that the story 
amply captures both the tragedy and 
healing that together spell the life of 
the human spirit on this globe. In this 
we can take hope: As Sayer says to a 
group of visitors at the film's end, 
there is in each human self a "spirit," 
and no disease or chemical can 
extinguish its desperate will to live and 
walk whole in the sunshine. 
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If the film of Awakenings makes 
less of, tames and diminishes, its 
source material, The Doctor makes 
much more of its somewhat meager 
source, a 1988 medical memoir by 
Edward Rosenbaum (originally titled A 
Taste of My Oum Medicine). In the film, 
a middle-aged cardiac surgeon, a 
quick-cut hotshot, gets a sore throat 
that turns out to be cancer. Expert, 
elegant, and successful (quite the 
opposite from Malcolm Sayer), Dr. 
Jack MacKee (the splendid William 
Hurt) loves his profession, and himself 
in it, singing and bantering with his 
cohorts during surgery. At first, the 
viewer cannot exactly tell whether 
Jack's infectious demeanor-
handsome, charming, jaunty, and 
witty--sterns from love of life or from 
arrogance. On one hand, he knows he 
has the good life, at least 
contemporary America's version of it, 
and he seems downright determined 
to enjoy it. On the other hand, he 
thinks he deserves it because he knows 
he is good at what he does. A nagging 
cough brings him to a colleague, who 
coolly drops news of a growth on his 
vocal chords. While radiation therapy 
cures most such lesions, the chance 
remains that this one might require a 
dangerous surgery that could, even if 
successful, leave him voiceless. Worse 
still, there is the prospect, however 
slight, that nothing will work and that 
this, indeed, is the beginning of the 
end. 
The invincible healer becomes a 
patient, and he does not like it very 
much. It is only in this regard that the 
film takes its inspiration from the 
book. While very scary, the disease is 
hardly the problem. Just as bad, 
seemingly, is the indignity of being a 
patient. Once god-like atop his 
medical Olympus, MacKee now suffers 
hospital waiting rooms and colleagues' 
often rude indifference. In short, 
finitude confronts MacKee in more 
ways than one. Much to its praise, and 
faithful to the Rosenbaum memoir, 
the film effectively hauls us through 
the series of emotional and physical 
shocks that being a patient entails. 
Symbolic of this complete assault is an 
enema mistakenly administered to 
MacKee, and he cannot talk to fend 
off the medical swat-team that invades 
his room. Mildly funny in the film, a 
last humiliation for the once-arrogant 
doctor, the event parallels increased 
emotional vulnerability. The decline 
in power culminates when Jack finds 
that radiation treatments have not 
worked, and he now faces perilous 
surgery. Assailed by disease, sick unto 
death physically and emotionally, fast 
Jack does not know what to do with 
himself. And it is here that the film 
begins to supply depths of soul-
searching and contemplation that are 
entirely lacking in the source. 
Either out of habit or simple 
pride, the insular, self-glorying doctor 
cannot turn to his long-suffering wife, 
whom he has kept at a cordial arm's 
length. Nor does his long-ignored 
pubescent son offer much hope for 
solace. Into this self-made void comes 
another patient, one facing certain 
doom from inoperable brain cancer. 
Predictably, the helper is an attractive 
young woman (don't the old or other 
males have anything credible to say to 
confused young men?). Appropriately 
named June, a seasonal token of new 
life, she shows Jack the way to relish 
and intimacy (we can at least be 
thankful that this message is imparted 
without the complications of romance, 
although they flirt with the idea of 
flirtation). Some reviewers have found 
the June subplot cheap corn, but it 
does allow for fine images of how life 
should indeed be lived, images that 
assert that life is a gift to be savored 
rather than frittered or ego-tripped. 
Indeed, as the plot suggests, for awhile 
before her death, June becomes a kind 
of angel who flits into Jack's life before 
disappearing. For her, as one 
gorgeous shot argues, life is a dance 
that hears music from deep within the 
inmost recesses of being. After such 
news, Jack sets out to fix a lot of bad 
things in his life: bedside demeanor, 
colleagues, marriage, medical 
education, and so on. The point is 
that his frailty, and the grace of June, 
have taught him how to feel and love. 
And so happily ends the film. 
To be sure, the central plot 
device in these two films is a cliche-at 
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least, of sorts. Loss and ill-health sober 
the soul enough to contemplate the 
sheer sensate and relational goodness 
of ordinary life, the irreplaceable good 
gift and wonderment of being alive. 
Very often, it seems, only the grim 
prospect of losing everything prods 
well-encased souls to love the least 
anything. And then, too, sometimes 
the best gifts come when and where we 
least expect them. Staring at death 
and oblivion, all that we take for 
granted and seldom pause to relish 
becomes new and fresh-suddenly of 
vital importance. That sort of hard-
won recognition is as old as Odysseus 
and Joseph, and in the late nineteenth 
century Tolstoy rendered its classic 
formulation in the harrowing Death of 
Ivan Ilyich, a starkly rich tale of 
terminal illness and new life. Like the 
assorted characters in these films, most 
everybody languishes for lack of some 
firm realism about the costs and gifts 
of life, death, and sleepwalking. The 
prospect of mortality can, by God's 
good grace, prove an ultimate tonic 
for being, awakening one and all into 
fervent delight in the majesty of 
human life.O 
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At the Shark Tank 
We press our faces 
to the glass, shudder 
under a thread rotted jaw. 
Pickets of teeth skim 
close as an embrace. 
No longer lovers, we deny 
an end, hover in the impotent 
solace of friendship. I fall prey 
to a lidless stare, opaque 
as milk, an ancient angry mind 
too blank for peace. 
I understand the ache 
for devourance 
and escape, a longing 
to shatter the glass 
between us. Sharks will thrash 
in ecstasy at our feet 
and I will reach 
to gash my palm 
on smooth grey shards 
of steel. Still 
no climax, just sinister blue 
fluctuations on your cheek. 
The ocean floor 
must be much darker, 
only the forward fluid motion 
of gills, slits into the body 
wide enough for a hand, 




Hospitality With An 
Attitude 
Maureen Jais-Mick 
I had just received communion 
and was prayerfully turning toward my 
seat when the usher hissed, "Stay right 
there." I froze. Immediately, my 
transgression was revealed - in this 
church one waits to be dismissed from 
the Lord's Supper. 
I'm Maureen-a recovering 
liturgist/church musician who's spent 
years in Lutheran settings. I've 
planned convention worship and 
directed worship committees. I've told 
clergy where to stand, when to move, 
what to wear and where to go. If 
anyone knows her way around the 
liturgy, it's me. However, after I 
retired from the organist-choirmaster 
biz and began worshipping in different 
places, I began to analyze feeling 
welcome at worship. 
I didn't know there were so many 
ways to distribute communion-
individual glasses already filled (the 
red, white or purple stuff is grape 
juice), individual glasses to be filled 
(too late! I was supposed to pick up a 
glass on the way to the railing), 
common cup. (But wait! do you take it 
and serve yourself or does the nervous 
lay assistant aim for your mouth?) 
Where does the little glass go when 
I'm done? Swallow the bread 
Maureen Jais-Mick has worked for many 
years as a Lutheran church musician in the 
Washington, D. C. area. She is presently 
devoting herself to business administration, 
with occasional lapses into column writing. 
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immediately or retain it for intinction? 
Consume the elements as they're 
received or wait for a signal? Kneeling 
or standing? Line communion or 
some elaborate formation known only 
to lifelong members? And, of course, 
the one I flunked: Take communion 
and leave or wait to be dismissed? 
Being a visitor has cured me of sitting 
in the front rows-a relief to my 
husband. In all fairness, I wasn't doing 
too well that morning before 
distribution, either. Sitting in a 
forward pew, I had boldly stood for the 
hymns-only to discover that this 
congregation always sits. 
I like the infrastructure of liturgy 
-the underlying order-and the way 
one part flows predictably into the 
next. I like clouds of incense, splendid 
vestments, paraments and banners, 
stained glass, metalwork, sculpture, 
lively acoustics, substantial preaching, 
enthusiastic singing, pipe organs and 
instruments. I like gospel Masses with 
electric bass, percussion and 
synthesizer, outdoor worship, 
traditional folk music, foreign tongues, 
and a cappella congregational singing. 
I like children's sermons aimed at kids, 
not designed as cuteness breaks for 
adults. I appreciate the potential for 
hospitality in all of the above. 
The best things about liturgical 
form are (I) you know what to expect 
next, and (2) there is flexibility, 
especially with a resource like Lutheran 
Boolr. of Worship. Both predictability and 
flexibility are necessary for hospitality. 
People who know what is expected of 
them are more comfortable in any 
situation, but people who repeat the 
same actions over and over again 
become automatons. 
My favorite model for liturgical 
hospitality is entertaining in the home. 
When guests arrive, we don't greet 
them and then wander back to what 
we were doing beforehand-leaving 
them to wonder what happens next. 
Even as children, we weren't excused 
from being hosts. We introduced 
ourselves, we fetched refreshments, we 
made "adult" conversation, and we 
helped our folks. We learned our 
families' traditions of hospitality by 
performing them. But since, as adults, 
we know these traditions thoroughly, 
we are also free to shape them to fit a 
situation or event. 
Hospitality has certain parts-
rites, if you will-a thorough 
housecleaning, floral decorations, 
special refreshments and foods, 
introduction of the guests to all 
present, directions for where to sit and 
how to serve, and conversations that 
include everyone. We are not casual 
about hospitality in our home, 
although we are definitely informal. 
So spare me another sermon 
likening the Eucharist to a magnificent 
wedding feast. You show me the 
pastor, musician and worship 
committee who put as much effort 
into worship as my family does into a 
wedding and I 'II show you a parish 
that's turning members away. At family 
weddings, no member is exempt from 
playing host. We all keep an eye on the 
caterer, the bar, the band, and 
especially anyone who's being left out 
of the merrymaking. Strangers often 
get more attention than old friends on 
these occasions because they need 
more. We're delighted they came. It's 
as simple as that. 
Contrary to what you've heard, 
31 
Lutheran liturgy isn't intrinsically 
inhospitable-as in, "Lutheran liturgy 
is too complicated for visitors. They 
get confused." Or, "Our services are 
too difficult for the people who live in 
the neighborhood (i.e., Blacks, 
Hispanics, Asians, etc.). That's why 
they don't come. And our services are 
too long." Ah, yes, let us never cease to 
be concerned for the unfortunate, 
attention-deficit disordered minorities 
surrounding our urban churches. 
What a challenge they are to 
evangelize. Why some of these people 
are arriving at other churches before 9 
a.m. and not leaving until past 2 p.m. 
is, like Lutheran liturgy, "too 
complicated." 
I recall the African American 
rector of an Episcopal church in 
Kansas City commenting on those 
trying to evangelize his parish 
neighborhood (this was the 1970s). 
He couldn't understand why they 
jettisoned the interesting stuff-
chant, incense, chasubles, etc. His 
parishioners relished the sounds, the 
textures and sweet odors, the beauty 
and the colors. Who wouldn't? They 
also enthusiastically introduced their 
own traditions into the worship. For 
them, it wasn't a choice between being 
African American or being 
Episcopalian, but a melding of many 
things beautiful and worshipful. The 
Mass has survived for a long time in 
many places among many peoples. It 
won't break if handled. Making it a 
reflection of the parish and the whole 
church can only strengthen it. 
The question in 1992 is not, 
"Should we culturally adapt the 
liturgy?" but "Where do we start?" For 
me, it is natural to begin with the arts. 
Here in Washington, D.C., if one walks 
down 16th or 14th Streets as church 
lets out, one can enjoy sartorial 
splendor and a love of liturgical 
costume without even entering the 
church buildings. On warm Sundays, 
the choirs are exotic combinations of 
purple, red, electric blue and green. 
The pastor of a local Pentecostal 
congregation garbs himself all in papal 
white-cassock, cape, biretta and 
shoes. He may be only a storefront 
preacher, but in his heart he and John 
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Paul II are the shepherds of their 
flocks and dress the part. 
Adaptation of the liturgy is good 
news for musicians, artists and all who 
value culture. It implies a knowledge 
of culture(s), which means that some 
hard work and study has gone into the 
process-surely more thought than 
repeating what we've always done. 
Someone commented to me that "If 
rap is what's happening, then rap 
belongs in church." Okay by me. How? 
Where? Give me some practical 
training. I've tried and tried and still 
cannot form my mouth to correctly 
produce those staccato, percussive 
sounds into the microphone. I'd also 
welcome some powerful contemporary 
texts, although I've got enough to get 
started-compliments of the Watts 
Man, Senor Long-and-Common Meter, 
Mister Rap Hymnody, a poet defmitely 
too legit to quit-Isaac Watts (1674-
1748). In fact, let's rise and rap 
together right now. Take a moment to 
get the beat going (accented syllables 
italicized) : 
Joy to the world, the Lord is come! 
Let earth receive its King 
(choir: He's the King!) 
Let ev'ry heart pre pan him room 
And heav'n and nature sing 
(choir: He's the King!) 
And heav'n and nature sing 
(choir: He's the King!) 
"Yo, Paul [Manz]," calls the head 
usher. "What kind of moves with the 
Doxology at the 11:00 service?" 
Praise God from whom all blessings flow, 
Praise him, all creatures here be low. 
Praise him above, ye heav'nly hosts, 
Praise Father, Son and Holy Ghost. 
Practically speaking, rapping the 
Doxology solves the last line "What 
rhythm do you use?" dilemma. 
An offertory procession with an 
attitude, that's what we'd have. But 
shouldn't all sacred song have an 
attitude? It's what Paul Manz, John 
Ferguson and a growing number of my 
colleagues bring to hymnody and why 
people are energized singing with 
them. Vestments and stained glass 
need attitude, too. A project 
unfortunately left undone when I gave 
up directing the Worship & Liturgical 
Arts Committee of the Washington 
Synod (ELCA) was commissioning a 
set of vestments for the bishop. After 
being moved to amazement by the 
Afrocentric textiles ofJanuar Umoja at 
The Smithsonian, it suddenly hit me 
that my committee's task wasn't to 
order some vestments. Our task was to 
take full advantage of six opportunities 
(blue, purple, white/gold, red, green 
and a cope) to celebrate our people-
Asians, Europeans, Africans, Spanish-
speaking, Native American-our 
Lutheranism, and our region. 
If hospitality is about making 
people welcome, we have to look at 
our architecture and art. Look around 
you. Ever get the feeling everybody in 
the Bible was fair-skinned? Isn't Israel 
near Jordan and Egypt? Didn'tJesus 
travel from place to place in the hot 
sun of the Middle East? Our parishes 
need more art-a continuous stream 
of it. I know you installed that statue 
when the building was dedicated 75 
years ago. It's very nice, but even the 
National Gallery changes its displays 
and, trust me, it's got better stuff than 
your church. Most likely, your 
members don't really notice it 
anymore. But visitors read your 
building's message. I certainly notice 
who's included and who's excluded as 
I visit to worship. What has your parish 
commissioned lately? Or did you 
consider the decorating finished for all 
time once the last stained glass window 
was installed? 
The parish at which I failed 
communion didn't plan to be 
inhospitable. The people in charge 
just forgot what it's like to be the 
outsider. Like many people, I'm on 
edge in a strange environment. The 
worship folder should help, but I've 
also discovered that most bulletins are 
not designed for those who need 
them. As it was recently explained to 
me, in my capacity as guest organist, by 
a patient church secretary, "If we 
include the information you want in 
the bulletin, the order of service will 
take up more than one page." Alert 
the media. 
The Cnsset 
But, as a former church secretary 
who scored "highly entrepreneurial" 
on some trendy 1980s personality test, 
I propose the User-Friendly Worship 
Folder. Here's the idea-free of charge. 
Anybody can come to church and be 
handed the regular bulletin. However, 
for an additional $5 participants can 
purchase a worship folder containing 
brief notes about the day's 
significance, complete music titles and 
composers' names, anthem texts and 
translations, names of all service 
participants, and directions for 
communion distribution. Parts of the 
service are identified-Confession and 
Forgiveness, Service of the Word, 
Service of Holy Communion, etc. All 
staff names, titles and office hours are 
printed. Ditto committee directors 
and times of regularly scheduled 
committee meetings. Organizations 
are identified by full name, followed 
by a concise blurb about their 
purpose. (This is 1992. It's okay to 
explain what Lutherans Concerned is 
concerned about.) "The WELCA 
invite all members to ... " is about as 
helpful to a visitor or new member as 
my all-time favorite, "See Bob after 
church if you want to contribute to 
this year's .... "And it's all wrapped in 
a piece of cover art worth saving. I may 
have to up the price to $6.50, but I'm 
confident that people will buy it.O 
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David L. Burrows. Sound, Speech, and 
Music. Amherst: The University of 
Massachusetts Press, 1990. 138 pp. 
$22.50. 
David Burrows would have us 
consider an "unconsidered ubiquity." 
While most people exist in their sonic 
environment without much thought, 
beyond the occasional outcry "fum that 
music down!" or "Can't you speak up?" 
Burrows writes from his dozen or so years 
of speculative thought about sound-
how is it in our experience?-what 
information power does it have in 
human development? why do we use it to 
define and extend ourselves?-and 
proposes a bold thesis: 
" ••• the distinctiveness of human beings as 
a species .•. is to a great extent an 
outgrowth of the distinctiveness of the 
way they UBe sound. ••• " 
Burrows calls his compact little 
book a "phenomenology of sound, 
speech, thought and music." Though he 
admits a beginning in his academic 
discipline, he argues that a quest for the 
ontology of music leads inevitably to 
roots where sonic implementation 
includes also that which we usually call 
speech. So this is not a musicological 
essay, but rather a systematics-
philosophical, psychological, biological, 
and often poetical- that centers on the 
living human body, itself a center that 
tends to treat everything outside itself as 
peripheral and dependent. 
This systematics of the human uses 
of sound proceeds itself in a systematic, 
logical way. The seven chapters are 
named: SOUND, VOICE, WORDS, 
WORDS AND MUSIC, WORDS IN 
MUSIC, WORDS ON MUSIC, 
INSTURMENTAUTIES. 
The human eye sees in straight 
lines; we are visually unconnected with 
things behind us or when we shut our 
eyes. Sound, however, though it may 
have slight directional qualities, 
surrounds us like the ocean of air in 
which we live. We are hard put to shut 
out sounds that intrude upon our privacy 
and we employ this sonic ubiquity to our 
purposes when we send out ourselves as 
sound waves to engulf, to "en-<>eean" the 
others among whom we live. "The self is 
the other than other." (4) 
Our voice comes from within our 
self, deep from within, from that which 
we sense physiologically and 
psychologically as our center. The 
unborn child hears sounds but waits to 
make sounds until birth. With the 
exhalation that follows upon the first 
intake of air, the child defines itself as a 
center among others. Humans learn 
soon after this in tializing of self to 
control and articulate exhaustion of air 
from the body with larynx, tongue, lips, 
and teeth. The waste product of 
respiration becomes that which 
empowers the self to reach out to other 
bodies. 
Words-here Burrows considers 
only oral phonation-are the efficient 
means humans have developed to leave 
the bodily center of beingness and take 
up residence in that freedom from other 
beings in this incorporeal realm that 
identifies the human species. Words 
quickly and precisely transfer ideas from 
one mind to another and, probably, 
ideas or thoughts are structured by 
sound in the process of phonation. 
Burrows calls speech "post-laryngeal 
phonation." Sounds produced "pre-
laryngeally" are from deeper within 
ourselves, again physiologically as well as 
psychologically. It is to this "seat of 
innocence" that we return when we 
make sounds into that human 
phenomenon called music. Music and 
speech are inseparable through 
separately locatable. 
When words and music coexist, as 
in a song, the tensions between 
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experience and innocence, articulated 
thought and non-verbal feeling are 
palpable. The composer and the poet 
live in an uneasy marriage. (Burrows' 
study at this point of Purcell's "Musick for 
a while shall all our cares beguile" is 
almost as lovely as the song.) 
Even more uneasy is the coming 
together of words about music. The 
attempt to explain in the manner of post-
laryngeal articulation the meaning of pre-
laryngeal utterance must fail. Even more 
so the setting down in graphics of that 
which is not visual. Printed words cannot 
capture music and notational symbols 
can never be the sounds. 
Burrows implies that the urge to 
expand beyond our own center the 
experience of music making which leads 
us to attempt musical notation is not 
unrelated to the urge which leads human 
beings to invent musical instruments. 
These devices and machines for 
producing sounds are closer or farther 
from our musical centers (compare oboe 
and piano), but almost always the 
instrumentalist imagines sounds 
produced by the body to be closer to the 
ideal. The violinist emulates the phrasing 
of a singer and senses her instrument as 
her own body. 
What then of the drummer? Or, 
how does one explain the self-expression 
of the hot-rodder dragging on Main 
Street? Where in this systematics is 
dance, that realization of the self's center 
in physical movement? How shall we 
deal with those collisions of self-
expanding sounds that we daily 
encounter: talking during a concert, 
radio sounds thwarting conversational 
ambitions, irreverent sounds in a holy 
silence? It would be asking more of this 
book than it intends. Burrows has 
a William F. Eifrig teaches music 
and chairs the department at VU. 
0 Carl Plantinga is an assistant 
professor of theatre arts at Hollins 
College. 
a David Truemper is a professor of 
theology at VU, and the executive 
officer of the Council of Societies for 
the Study of Religion, newly-located at 
vu. 
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chosen not to include any study of 
extraneous sounds in our environment; 
we can hope, though , that his speculative 
thought will take up the fact that our 
technological accomplishments have 
been always accompanied by increases in 
accidental sonic experiences. Burrows 
has given us some ways of understanding 
what it is we do in our mostly 
"unconsidered ubiquity." With his 
leadership-he claims no particular 
originality and cites generously others 
who are similarly considering their sonic 
environment--each of us can have a go 
at understanding the other-than-other 
which is ourselves as well as the others 
too. 
The area in Burrows' study that 
seems to me most promising of fruition is 
one he only slightly indicates. At the 
beginning he posits three fields in which 
centripetal I centrifugal action of the self 
happens. Each field has an associated 
topology, a configuration that defines the 
action possible in that field. Field one is 
physical space (the body); Field two is 
where thought takes place (the mind); 
Field three is the diffusion of sense-of-self 
"through the full range of awareness." 
Field three he identifies as the "field of 
the spirit" though he is quick to require 
that we understand "spirit" in a "not 
primarily theological way." Nevertheless, 
musicians (and I here include listeners 
along with makers) who have a care for 
the practice of music in our spiritual life 
together may wish to join me in a quest to 
know better how sound enables us in the 
topologies of Field three. 
Let Burrows' last paragraph lead 
on: 
Sound shaped into music is perhaps the 
most direct way into Field three, and Field 
three is a way out of one and two and the 
strains within and between them. Field 
three forgives mereness and mortality. 
Action here turns back on itself and 
converges on stasis. When Field three is 
fully realized, there can be no friction 
between part and part, part and whole--
there are no parts, and so no particulars, 
and no partiality. There is no possible 
disorientation, for there is only one 
possible orientation, and that is to be one 
with the whole. 
W. F. Eifrig 
Quentin J. Schultze (Project 
Coordinator), Roy M. Anker (Project 
Editor}, James D. Bratt, William D. 
Romanowski, John William Worst, and 
Lambert Zuidervaart Dancing in the Darlt: 
Youth, Popular Culture, and the Electronic 
Media. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1991. 
348 pp. $14.95. 
This ambitious book, authored by 
six scholars, surveys and analyzes the 
relationships between youth, popular 
culture and the electronic media. A 
usual means of editing such a book 
would be to include essays written by and 
attributed to individual scholars; the 
editor would supply the introduction and 
show how the essays contribute to the 
overall theme. This book is put together 
differently, however; the whole is 
presented as the work of all six through 
corporate attribution, with Quentin]. 
Schultze listed as Project Coordinator 
and Roy M. Anker as Project Editor. 
Dancing in the Darlr. is the result of 
eleven months of group study at the 
Calvin Center for Christian Scholarship. 
Although the authors all are Calvin 
College professors and share a Reformed 
Christian perspective (and, as they admit, 
that of white, middle-aged, North 
American males), differences in point of 
view appear in the text This can be seen 
as a strength of the book, since it mirrors 
the complexity of the issues. Dancing in 
the Darlr. is always careful not to make easy, 
dismissive pronouncements about the 
worth of any element of popular culture 
or its effects on youth or the broader 
society. Individual chapters offer 
informative and perceptive analyses of 
the nature and history of rock and roll, 
MTV, movies, and television and their 
social and personal effects. In spite of 
occasional inconsistencies in point of 
view, the book as a whole serves as an 
excellent overview of North American 
popular culture, the entertainment 
industry, and their relationship to youth. 
Overall, the authors warn us that 
contemporary electronic culture, while 
having beneficial effects, may also be 
doing much harm. 
Chapters on the general electronic 
media concentrate on their sociological 
effects. The authors claim that the 
entertainment industry promotes 
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generational separateness to more 
successfully tap the lucrative youth 
market. The programming offered 
encourages long-term immaturity by 
emphasizing adolescent versions of 
identity and intimacy, promotes 
consumption as a means to happiness, 
discourages historical perspective, and 
substitutes passive entertainment for 
active participation in the world. Youth 
depend on the electronic media to gain 
a (superficial) sense of generational 
commonality, and the entertainment 
industry promotes this identification to 
maintain its economic bonanza. 
While sending clear warning 
signals about negative effects of positive 
art, the authors also maintain the 
importance of our taking it seriously. In 
a chapter on evaluating popular art, the 
authors attack an elitism which draws 
rigid (and often unjustified) qualitative 
distinctions between high art and 
popular art, and segregates the high arts 
from their social context through the 
promotion of the pure formal study of 
the art form. The authors promote what 
they call "contextualism," the idea that 
how "art is produced and how it 
functions in life and society are crucial 
for deciding its goodness" (286). 
The book also offers chapters on 
individual media. Among the best are 
those on rock music and Music 
Television (MTV), though here the 
reader gets differing perspectives. The 
excellent chapter on rock music seems to 
have been written by someone 
sympathetic to the genre. It carefully 
describes both the art and the business, 
the constructive and the destructive, and 
concludes that rock music "mirrors the 
contradictions present in contemporary 
life" and "celebrates life and freedom but 
also wallows in self-indulgence and 
despair" and ultimately "heals but ... also 
hurts" (176). In contrast, the equally 
persuasive chapter on MTV sees the 
network and its effects as an unmitigated 
social disaster. MTV, the authors claim, 
offers only the non-stop promotion of 
consumption and fabricated intimacy, 
and constitutes "one of the most 
powerful forms of contemporary 
propaganda" (204). 
Dancing in the Dark is well-written 
and eclectic-packed with provocative 
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analyses and ideas. In point of view it 
sometimes wavers. It often seems to 
claim that popular culture and the 
electronic media have apocalyptic 
negative effects for youth and society. 
Elsewhere it implies that the today's so-
called "youth crisis" is simply the latest 
manifestation of the age-old problems of 
adolescence and that the media can help 
as well as hinder the process of maturing. 
But this tension is quite healthy; the 
issues here are so complicated that none 
of us can claim to have settled them once 
and for all. 
Carl Plantinga 
Robert Kolb. Confessing the Faith: 
Reformers Define the Church, 1530-1580. 
Saint Louis: Concordia Publishing 
House, 1991. 184 pp. Paper. $14.95. 
Kolb's research into the 
Reformation era's middle and later 
stages continues to sparkle with 
freshness of information and clarity of 
presentation. The present volume, in 
Concordia's "Scholarship Today" 
series, is no exception. Kolb gathers a 
wealth of data not otherwise available 
to non-specialists in order to show 
what those involved m the 
Reformation movement in northern 
Germany in the middle decades of the 
sixteenth century thought about their 
act of confession at Augsburg in 1530. 
Key is Kolb's argument that 
theologians at mid-century reflected 
on the document which came to enjoy 
formal standing in their midst. The 
chapters in which Kolb presents his 
summaries of this information are the 
heart of the argument and are 
absolutely first-rate. 
The constraints of the series, on 
the other hand, seem to force the 
impressively-presented data into the 
service of an alternative agenda-
signalled by the banishing of the rich 
documentation to the position of 
endnotes rather than footnotes, and 
by the appending of a series of 
"Reflection Questions" (unsigned, but 
evidently not Kolb's work) whose 
intent is indicated in their 
introductory paragraph: "for 
understanding religion, confes-
sionalism, and present-day 
implications and applications." 
Despite this ambiguity of 
purpose, the book contains thoughtful 
reflections in which Kolb challenges 
his readers: "It is impossible to live in 
the spirit of Augsburg and not be 
determinedly ecumenical (137)" or 
"the articles or topics of the faith (as 
found, for example, in the Augsburg 
Confession) are not so many equally 
valuable pearls on a string, with so 
m_any required to make the string a 
necklace and so many dispensible. 
Instead, [Luther and Melanchthon] 
believed that Biblical teaching is like a 
human body. Christ is its head; 
decapitated it dies" (136). Such 
assertions, grounded in a rich fare of 
documentation, will reward the 
thoughtful reader. 
David M. Truemper 
Notes on Poets: 
Barbara Bazyn lives in Chelsea, Iowa, 
where she is a freelance writer. Her 
poem, "The White Ideal Sea" 
appeared in the December 1991 issue 
of The Cresset. 
Gary Fincke teaches at Susquehanna 
University and publishes often in The 
Cresset. In March, his poem "Inventing 
Angels" appeared in Harper's. 
Barbara Fischer works with the writers' 
program at Johns Hopkins University. 
This is her first appearance in The 
Cresset. 
Fritz Fritsche} sent us this poem some 
time ago. If he sees this, we hope he 
will let us know where he is. 
J.T. Ledbetter, a poet whose work 
appears frequently in The Cresset, 
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